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Keeping an Eye on the I.N.S.: A Case
for Civilian Review of Uncivil
Conduct* t
Stephen A. Rosenbaumt
In a free and democratic society... the history of American policing has
been the history of various attempts and models for imposing and maintain-
ing civilian oversight on this vital task.'
He's in uniform, he's performing his job . . . and he got into a situation
where he thought it was necessary to fire his gun. I don't see any criminal
complaint; there may be some procedural problems.2
* Copyright © 1994 by La Raza Law Journal, Inc.
t This article is a revised version of a paper presented at the symposium "American Dream -
Immigrant Reality," University of California, Berkeley, School of Law (Boalt Hall), April 2-3, 1993.
t Attorney at Law and Director, California Rural Legal Assistance (CRLA) Foundation Immi-
gration Project; Lecturer, University of California at Berkeley, School of Law (Boalt Hall); Master of
Public Policy, 1979; J.D., 1980, University of California at Berkeley. The author thanks Janet Walsh,
Boalt Hall 1995, for her research, interviews and editorial suggestions, undertaken with the support of
CRLA Foundation. The author further wishes to thank David A. Benoit, Boalt Hall 1994, Richard
Garcfa, Boalt Hall 1995, and the staff of La Roza Law Journal for their very capable editorial assistance.
1. Prof. Hubert G. Locke, Address to the First Annual Conference on Civilian Oversight of the
American Police, Univ. of Illinois at Chicago (Sept. 13, 1984).
2. Patrick McDonnell, Questions Remain in Border Agent's Shooting at Van, L. A. TIMES, May
31, 1990 at BI (Lieutenant Dean Girdner, Chula Vista, California Police Department, speaking to a
reporter six days after his department investigated the shooting of two undocumented immigrants by a
Border Patrol agent).
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I.
INTRODUCTION
"Procedural problems" does not begin to describe the deficiencies in
the investigation of alleged misconduct by officers of the United States Im-
migration and Naturalization Service (INS).3
According to one monitoring group, 116 administrative complaints of
immigration-related abuse were lodged against immigration officers over a
two-year period.4 During the same time, 20 reports were made to Congress
and 27 lawsuits were filed in federal court.5 The allegations ranged from a
beating in Florida and an assault in Texas to a shooting in Arizona and a
hit-and-run in California.6 The complaints included seven deaths.
7
As the highest funded unit' of an increasingly militarized9 INS, the
United States Border Patrol warrants heightened public scrutiny. To many
Americans - and would-be Americans - the Border Patrol is the very
symbol of immigration law enforcement.' 0 Yet, enforcement is not the sole
3. The INS or "Service" is the national agency charged with implementing immigration and
citizenship laws, including procedures for admitting and expelling aliens. It has 36 district offices
worldwide and 20 Border Patrol sectors in the United States. CHARLES GORDON AND STANLEY MAI-
MAN, I IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE, § 3.03 [6], (rev. ed. 1993). The Border Patrol is the police
arm of the INS. For a summary of INS statutory responsibilities and organization, see HOUSE COMM. ON
GOVERNMENr OPERATIONS, THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE: OVERWHELMED AND
UNPREPARED FOR THE FUTURE, H.R. RP. No. 216, 6-10 (1993)[hereinafter, OVERWHELMED AND
UNPREPARED].
4. AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMrTEE (AFSC) IMMIGRATION LAW ENFORCEMENT MONI-
TORING PROJECT, SEALoNG OUR BORDERS: THE HUMAN TOLL 35-38 (1992) (period extending from May
1989 to May 1991) [hereinafter, SEALING OUR BORDERS].
5. Id.
6. Id. at 22-24.
7. Id.
8. The Border Patrol received the most money and staff of all INS enforcement units between
1986 and 1990. JASON JUFFRAS, IMPACT OF a IMMIGRATION REFORM AND CONTROL ACT ON THE
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 38 (1991). In the words of a congressional immigration
policy staffer, "Funding for the Border patrol is politically valuable for Congressmen [sic] from the
Southwest because it gives the appearance that they are doing something about illegal aliens." Id. at 33.
For a more detailed summary of Border patrol allocations, see F. D. BEAN, Er. AL., OPENING AND
CLOSING THE DOORS: EVALUATING IMMIGRATION REFORM AND CONTROL 44 (The RAND Corporation -
The Urban Institute, 1989).
9. See Comments by Roberto Martfnez, 7 LA RAZA L.J. 84 (1994); AMERICAS WATCH, BRUTAL-
rrY UNCHECKED: HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES ALONG THE U.S. BORDER WITH MEXICO 5 (1992)(noting the
recent arming of agents with high-powered weapons to combat narcotics trafficking and to "strengthen
enforcement against illegal immigration and violent crime by illegal aliens.")[hereinafter, BRUTALITY
UNCHECKED].
10. The Border Patrol "commands public attention because it performs a visible and demanding
task." JUFFRAS, IMPACT OF THE IMMIGRATION AND REFORM ACT, supra note 8, at 32. According to one
congressional staffer, "When people think of INS, they think of the men in green at the border." Id. at
33. One recent indicator of the Patrol's visibility is the President's proposal to increase its ranks by 600.
Fact Sheet: Initiatives to Curb Illegal Immigration (July 27, 1993)(on file with the author). This propo-
sal was included in "The Immigration Law Enforcement Act of 1993," S. 1571, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993), introduced by California Senator Dianne Feinstein. The bill also incorporates a suggestion by
California's other senator, Barbara Boxer, that an additional 300 positions be filled by members of the
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province of the INS police force, the Border Patrol. Agents, such as those
of the Customs Service and other units within the INS, also have a role in
the application of immigration laws. t" The need for civilian oversight is
similarly applicable to these other actors.
A decade has passed since the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights iden-
tified serious problems in the INS complaint review procedures and recom-
mended changes in a report to the President and Congress.12  Those
problems include delays in investigation, lack of public awareness of the
process, no acknowledgment of receipt of complaints, deficiencies in the
selection of investigators and investigative procedures and an inadequate
statistical record of complaints and disposition.13 The same problems
plague the system today, and almost none of the recommendations have
been implemented. 4
The issue of gratuitous violence by INS officers has continued to cap-
ture the attention of the INS leadership, although its response remains
equivocal and erratic. In 1990, the Commissioner acknowledged that
"[e]scalating violence on the southern border has resulted in injuries and
even deaths" and vowed that his agency would "begin immediately to deter-
mine what steps the INS can take to eliminate or dramatically reduce these
incidents." 5 But, a 1992 communiqu6 from the Commissioner's office
strikes a defensive tone in responding to a congressional inquiry about the
Border Patrol: 'Those who allege these agents are wild and reckless are
badly mistaken. '"16
National Guard acting under Border Patrol auspices "in a civilian capacity." Senator Barbara Boxer,
Press Release, Senator Boxer Unveils Six-Point Immigration Plan 1 (Aug. 17, 1993 )(on file with the
author).
11. These include examiners, investigators, detention and deportation officers, intelligence and
anti-smuggling agents, special agents, inspectors and other field personnel of the INS. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 100.2(b); GORDON AND MAILMAN, supra note 3, at §§ 3.18, 8.05-8.09. The Customs officers include
special agents, inspectors, fines, penalties and forfeiture officers, customs aides and other officers under
the Commissioner of Customs. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 482, 507, 2082. Some policy makers have suggested
that the Border Patrol and Customs Service be consolidated into one "Border Enforcement Agency."
California Latino Legislative Caucus, Making Immigration Policy Work in the United States 10 (1993).
For an overview of the Customs Service complaint procedures, see Frontier Injustice: Human Rights
Abuses Along the U.S. Border with Mexico Persist Amid Climate of Impunity, NEWS FROM AMERICAS
WATCH, May 13, 1993, Vol. V, No. 4, 1, 42-43 [hereinafter, Frontier Injustice].
12. U.S. Comm. ON CiviL RIGHTS, THE TARNISHED GOLDEN DOOR: CivI. RiGnrrs IsSUES IN IMMI-
GRATION 117-131 (1980)[hereinafter, THE TARNISHED GOLDEN DOOR].
13. Id. at 120-27.
14. SEALING OUR BORDERS, supra note 4, at 3.
15. Patrick McDonnell, INS Chief Orders Review of Lethal Force by Border Patrol, L. A. TIMES
Dec. 7, 1990, at A16. (quoting Former Commissioner Gene McNary). In contrast, his predecessor, Alan
Nelson, has refused to acknowledge any abuses by the Patrol, calling its officers "well-trained, well-
disciplined and.. .very good." Alan Nelson, Remarks at Human Rights and the North American Free
Trade Agreement Conference, University of California - Extension, Sacramento, California (Sept. 24,
1993).
16. See Letter from Bonnie Derwinski, Director of Congressional and Public Affairs, to Rep.
Nancy Pelosi 2 (Sept. 21, 1992)(on file with the author)(regarding alleged shootings, vehicular pursuits
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In 1993, the then Acting Commissioner wrote that she was "seriously
concerned" about a human rights organization's allegations of continuing
abuse and inadequate mechanisms to curtail it. 7 She pledged to "aggres-
sively pursue[ ]" claims of misconduct and "strictly adhere" to investiga-
tive and disciplinary procedures.1 8  However, the INS stopped short of
endorsing changes in those criticized procedures.1 9 To call for civilian
oversight of this national police force is to address "one of the oldest, most
time-honoured issues of public policy in America."20
There are a variety of emotions, social forces, reasoning and judgment
that may affect the decision of a law enforcement officer to use excessive
force. 2 Police behaviorist Javier Valenzuela Malag6n, in his comments
appearing at page 92, infra of this issue, asserts that it is the very function
of the Border Patrol "to persecute" migrants with "insults which express the
intolerance and frustration" of the unit.22 Another expert, anthropologist
Victor Clark Alfaro, in his comments published infra at page 90, notes that
the circumstances surrounding migration from Mexico to the United States,
when taken in toto, are tantamount to "an act of violence.- 23 Whatever the
root causes, border violence must be curtailed.
and other incidents). Derwinski contended, "the Border Patrol is comprised of decent and caring per-
sons..." Id. The recently confirmed commissioner, Doris Meissner, was more sanguine in her ap-
praisal of the Patrol. While noting the importance of the agency's "professionalism," she observed that
there is "fear and trepidation on both sides." Marc Sandalow, INS Chief Says Illegals' Goal Isn't Wel-
fare, S.F. CHRON., Oct 30, 1993 at Al.
17. Letter from Chris Sale, Acting Commissioner, United States Border Patrol to District Direc-
tors and Chief Patrol Agents at 1 (July 18, 1993)(This letter was written in response to Americas
Watch's release of Frontier Injustice, supra note I l)[hereinafter, "Sale Letter"](on file with the author).
18. Id.
19. Id. Commissioner Sale declared that she was "convinced that the vast majority of those re-
sponsible for enforcing immigration laws do so in a humane and respectful manner." Id.
20. Locke, supra note 1. at 1. But see Richard J. Terrill, Complaint Procedures: Variations on the
Theme of Civilian Participation, 10 J. oF POLICE ScL. & ADMIN. 398, 398 (1982)(police use of force is
one of "basic monopolies of power" which citizens grant to government with "good deal of latitude").
21. See PETER SCHARF AND ARNOLD BINDER, THE BADGE AND THE BULLET: POLICE USE OF
DEADLY FORCE 139-180 (1983) for a discussion of this phenomenon in urban police departments [here-
inafter, BADGE AND THE BuLLET].
22. Comments by Valenzuela Malag6n, 7 LA RAZA L.J. 92 (1994). (function of the Border Patrol
is to persecute with insult, intolerance and frustration.) See also Ashley Dunn, Official's Exit Blamed on
Turmoil in INS, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1991 at A3 (describing the low morale, high workload and limited
resources of INS and Border Patrol officers); Patrick McDonnell and Sebastian Rotella, Crossing The
Line: Turmoil in the U.S. Border Patrol, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1993 at Al (reviewing "street justice" and
other lawlessness among rank-and-file agents resulting from inadequate policies on recruitment, supervi-
sion, investigation and discipline)[hereinafter, Crossing the Line].
23. Comments by Victor Clark Alfaro, 7 LA RAZA L.J. 90 (1994). Both Clark Alfaro and
Valenzuela Malag6n note that the violence is not exclusively the domain of United States law enforce-
ment officers or even the government itself, but may be committed by individual citizens. See Com-
ments by Valenzuela Malag6n, supra note 22, at 93-94. According to Valenzuela, complaints against
the U.S. Border Patrol account for about 20% of the immigrants' complaints regarding border violence.
Id. The solution, according to both Clark and Valenzuela, is vigilance on both sides of the U.S.-Mexico
border. See Comments by Clark Alfaro, at 90-91; Comments by Valenzuela Malag6n, supra note 22, at
95-96. For an account of violence on the Mexican side of the border, see NATIONAL COMMISSIoN FOR
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In this article, I first document examples of misconduct by the Border
Patrol and other immigration and customs agents and examine the current
INS internal complaint system. Next, I set out some of the necessary fea-
tures of a civilian or external review process, many of which are embodied
in legislation recently introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives, with
an emphasis on those features unique to immigrants or immigration en-
forcement. Finally, I lay out some of the alternatives, or complements, to
external review and how they are useful or limited in mitigating abusive
behavior.
II.
ABUSES ARE WELL DOCUMENTED
Two prominent non-governmental organizations, Americas Watch24
and the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) Immigration Law
Enforcement Monitoring Project,25 each issued recent reports which chroni-
cle "pervasive"26 INS misconduct in California, Arizona, New Mexico and
Texas during the arrest and detention of undocumented immigrants.27 An
HuMAN RIGHTS, REPORT ON HuMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS OF MEXICAN MIGRATORY WORKERS ON [SIC]
RouTE TO THE NORTHERN BORDER, CROSSING THE BORDER AND UPON ENTERING THE SouTHERN
UNITED STATES BORDER STRIP 36-48 (1991)[hereinafter, MEXICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION].
24. BRUTALrY UNCHECKED, supra note 9. Americas Watch, a division of Human Rights Watch,
released a follow-up report one year later in May 1993, Frontier Injustice, supra note 11, with almost
the same conclusions.
25. SEALING OUR BORDERS, supra note 4. Much of the documentation incorporated in this and the
earlier AFSC reports was obtained by symposium keynote speaker Roberto Martinez. For an overview,
see Martinez, supra note 9. See also Allegations of Violence Along the United States-Mexico Border,
Hearings before the Subcomm. on Human Rights and International Organizations of the House Comm.
on Foreign Affairs (hereinafter, "Allegations of Violence"), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990)(statement of
Roberto Martinez); Testimony of Maria Jimrnez, AFSC Immigration Law Enforcement Monitoring Pro-
ject Before H.R. Subcomm. on Int'l Law, Immigr. and Refugees (Aug. 5, 1992 )(on file with the author).
26. Id. at 1.
27. The term "immigrant" is not necessarily used here as a term of art, i.e. a person who intends to
immigrate to another country or adjust her status to that of permanent resident. See 8 U.S.C.
§ I 101(a)(15), (20). It is interchanged with the word "alien," defined under the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act as "any person not a citizen or national of the United States." Id. § 1101(a)(3). Many
foreign-born and others find the latter term offensive. See, e.g., Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dic-
tionary (1986)(defining alien as "belonging or relating to another person, place or thing: STRANGE...
differing in nature or character typically to the point of incompatibility..."); Webster's Third New
International Dictionary (1986)("... repugnant in nature: HOSTILE, OPPOSED..."). It is nonetheless
an accepted and much used term. Michael J. Nufiez, Note, Violence at Our Border: Rights and Status of
Immigrant Victims of Hate Crimes and Violence Along the Border Between the United States and Mex-
ico, 43 HASTrINGS L.J. 1573, 1575 n. 9 (1992). See Comments by Valenzuela Malag6n, supra note 22,
(criminalization and negative ideological classification inherent in the term "illegal alien.") The day
may not be far off when members of the immigrants' rights community promote the use of "alien" or
"illegal alien" as a way of reclaiming an offensive term. On the importance of group names and pre-
ferred terms of reference, see David Hayes-Bautista and Jorge Chapa, Latino Terminology: Conceptual
Bases for Standardized Terminology, 77 AM. J. OF PuBLic HEALTH 61, 66-67 (1986); Kimberl6 Wil-
liams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Litigation in Antidiscrimination
Law, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1331, 1332, n. 2 (1988).
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earlier report by Mexico's National Commission for Human Rights simi-
larly documents cases of "mistreatment or abuse" by various U.S. law en-
forcement officers, mainly immigration service or customs agents.28
Americas Watch characterized these human rights abuses as "similar
in kind and severity" to those occurring in other countries and labeled the
United States' response as "defensive and unyielding."29 The renowned
human rights monitoring organization also reported that the procedures for
investigation of the alleged abuse are ill-defined and ineffective.30
According to AFSC, 1,274 cases of abuse in immigration law enforce-
ment were reported from May 1989 to May 1991.31 While complaints of
verbal and psychological abuse make up the largest segment of reported
instances, physical abuse and illegal or inappropriate searches, the second
most numerous category, produce the greatest consequences. 2 Typical of
the misconduct are the following shootings, beatings, sexual assaults and
other abusive acts:
0 Francisco Ruiz Chdvez, a Mexican national, was shot at close range
in the stomach and buttocks in 1989 while attempting to stop Border Patrol
Agent Walter Davenport from dragging his pregnant wife and placing his
foot on her stomach. No charges were ever filed against Agent Davenport,
who remained on active duty in the same locale near the California-Mexico
border. Rufz Chivez was charged with assaulting the agent in the
incident.
33
0 Ismael Ramirez, a minor, was thrown to the pavement during a
1988 neighborhood sweep in central California by Border Patrol Agent
Michael Lewis, landing on the back of his head and neck. Agent Lewis and
his partner brought the young Mexican to an emergency room, saying he
had fallen, thus misleading the hospital personnel about the possible sever-
ity of the injuries. Ramirez lapsed into a coma and died of a skull fracture
and brain hemorrhage.34
28. MExicAN HUMAN RiGHrs COMMISSION, supra note 23, at 52-65. The Commission's findings
are based largely on information from consular officials, with most abuse being found in Texas and
California. The report also includes incidents of immigrant mistreatment by Mexican law enforcement
officials inside Mexico and by private individuals inside the United States. Id. at 36-46, 49-51. For
possible redress of nongovernmental acts of violence, see Nuifez, supra note 27, at 1592-97.
29. BRUTALrty UNCHECKED, supra note 9, at 1. But see Sale Letter, supra note 17.
30. BRUTALtrrY UNCHECKED, supra note 9, at 2 (noting the overlapping jurisdiction of the Office
of Inspector General and the Office of Professional Responsibility).
31. SEALmr.. OuR BORDERS, supra note 4, at 19-20.
32. Id. at 17. In 1990, AFSC's Immigration Law Enforcement Monitoring Project (ILEMP) inau-
gurated a computerized system for tracking and categorizing rights violations in the border areas. Id.
33. BRurALrrtY UNCHECKED, supra note 9, at 16-17. Rufz had raised his arm to throw a rock
before he was shot.
34. Id. at 22-25. Agent Lewis' record shows allegations of misconduct even before this incident.
In 1983 he was involved in two incidents in which the vehicle he was driving struck pedestrians, killing
one immigrant. The California Highway Patrol investigation found that there was probable cause to
believe that he had committed misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter, but Lewis was never prosecuted.
[Vol. 7:1
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0 In 1991, Jos6 Gilbardo Valdez Ortega was assaulted by agents at
the Falfurrias, Texas Border Patrol Station. While he was handcuffed, an
officer beat him on the chest. Valdez Ortega was thrown to the ground,
dragged behind a wall and choked and further beaten. The Guatemalan was
then taken inside a trailer and told to remove his pants. There, an agent,
uttering vulgarities, approached Valdez Ortega with an 18-inch vibrating
instrument which he used to shock him on the buttocks and neck.
35
0 In 1990, Sabina Rocha, a young domestic worker in San Diego
County, was stopped by a Border patrol agent'while walking with a friend.
The agent asked the women if they were prostitutes. He later took Rocha
aside, reached into her clothes and fondled her breasts and genitals while
claiming to search for drugs. Rocha filed a $1 million claim for damages.
The matter was referred by the Office of Inspector General to the FBI.
36
0 In 1992, unarmed Dario Miranda Valenzuela was shot twice in the
back by Patrol Agent Michael Elmer as he tried to run back across the
Arizona border into Mexico. After the killing, Elmer dragged the victim's
body approximately fifty yards through the Mariposa Canyon and attempted
to bury it. Five agents were present when the shooting took place, but it
was not reported until 15 hours later. 37  Although charged with murder,
Elmer was later acquitted on all counts.3"
• In 1978, toward the end of her pregnancy, Maria Juana Contreras
was a passenger in a car stopped by U.S. Customs officers at the U.S.-
The agent was promoted to a position teaching vehicle handling to junior agents. McDonnell, Crossing
The Line, supra note 22. In 1985, several lawful resident farmworkers sued Lewis and others for exces-
sive use of force, kidnapping, false imprisonment, assault and battery. First Amended Complaint,
Casarez v. Riedinger, No. C-87-20267 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 1987). The government settled the suits, but
never admitted wrongdoing. Stipulation and Order Approving Compromise Settlement sub nom.
Casarez v. United States, No. C-87-20267 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 1990). Lewis was never indicted. After
the Ramfrez incident, local activists were successful in calling for an on-site congressional hearing on
border violence. See Premian a Noticiero Por Informar Sobre Injusticia a Campesino, SEMILLA 9 (Feb.
1992).
35. BRUTALITY UNcHEcKED, supra note 9, at 34. Valdez Ortega reported, "There were other
officers in the room and they all began to laugh. ... He touched me with the apparatus on my buttocks
and it shocked me. He put the apparatus against my neck and it kept shocking me. He then took me
outside and forced me to sign a document." Another Guatemalan recounted similar taunting and harass-
ment in the presence of other Patrol agents at the Rivera Beach, Florida station the previous year: "he
one agent who arrested me asked... Do you have AIDS?.... Get your little ass over here ... go to the
bathroom and wash off real good with the other officer so he can screw you .... SEALING OUR
BORDERS, supra note 4, at 21.
36. Probe of Border Patrol Sex Case is Confirmed, THE SAN DIEGO UNION, Feb. 9, 1991 AT B6.
See also Sex Assault by Border Agent Alleged, BLADE-CITIZEN, Feb. 9, 1991 at B I.
37. Frontier Injustice, supra note 11, at 4-5.
38. United States v. Elmer, CR-92-456-TUC (D. Ariz. 1992). Elmer was also acquitted on
charges of obstructing justice, attempted murder and aggravated assault for allegedly shooting at another
immigrant, and one charge of aggravated assault for threatening his partner. Elmer allegedly pointed his
unauthorized semi-automatic rifle at his partner and said, "we're not going to talk about this when we
get off this hill." Tessie Borden, Jury Clears Border Agent in Alien's Killing, ARIZ. DAILY STAR, Dec.
17, 1992 at Al. See also infra notes 253-258 and accompanying text.
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Mexico border for a vehicle inspection. While being interrogated, she had
difficulty breathing and began spitting up, losing vision, sweating profusely
and losing consciousness for brief periods. The officers failed to administer
first aid, but, eventually, at the request of Contreras' daughter, they called
an ambulance. She died before arriving at the hospital from an apparent
heart attack brought on by severe emotional distress. Contreras' husband
and children sued the officers and the U.S. government for negligence. No
damages were awarded; the decision was affirmed on appeal.39
• Miguel, a minor from Guatemala, was stopped by the Border Patrol
in 1992 after entering the United States near Nogales, Arizona in the com-
pany of several Mexicans. The Mexicans were returned to Mexico, but
Miguel was taken for a ride by two agents in their patrol car. During the
ride, one of the agents slammed Miguel's hand in the door, breaking his
wrist. After releasing the young man's hand several minutes later, one of
the agents struck Miguel on the face with a gun and threatened to "string
him up by his hands and feet and shoot him" if he reported the incident to
anyone. He was told to say he injured his hand in a fall.4
There have been other acts of recklessness by immigration officials,
such as the misuse of firearms and the "high-speed chase." This latter tactic
has come under increasing fire since the 1992 incident which resulted in the
death of six persons in San Diego County, California.4
Verbal threats and harassment are also the subject of many com-
plaints.42 Border Patrol agents have routinely called undocumented immi-
39. American Friends Service Committee, et. al. v. United States, No. 11072 at 12-13 [hereinafter
AFSC v. United States]. Petition filed with the Organization of American States' Inter-American Com-
mission on Human Rights by the Center for Human Rights and Constitutional Law, California Rural
Legal Assistance, ACLU and the Law Offices of Ira Gollobin (Aug. 12, 1992)(on file with the author).
40. Telephone interview with Lynn Marcus, Attorney, Southwest Refugee Rights Project, (Aug.
18, 1993). See also Lynn Marcus, Testimony Before the United States Commission on Civil Rights, 3-4
(San Diego, Apr. 17, 1993)(on file with the author).
41. The INS acknowledged 75 high-speed chases in and around the suburban San Diego commu-
nity of Temecula in 1989 alone. See CAL. A.J.REs. 93, 1991-92 Reg. Sess. (as introduced June 11,
1992)(memorializing the President and Congress to direct INS to publicly explain its high-speed chase
policies and to revise these policies in the interest of public safety). But see Cino v. INS, - F.3d -, 94
Daily Journal D.A.R. 2054 (Feb. 18, 1994)(9th Cir. 1994)(affirming judgment that Border Patrol is not
liable for injury to third party resulting from high-speed chase).
42. See, e.g., Settlement Agreement and Order, Pearl Meadows Mushroom Farm v. Nelson, Civ.
No. C-82-1896 (N.D. Cal., Dec. 17, 1991) at 13-14 [hereinafter Pearl Meadows Settlement Agree-
ment]; Declaratory Judgment Pearl Meadows Mushroom Farm v. Nelson, Civ. No. C-82-1896, at 15
(for proscriptions on threats, obtaining confessions, verbal and psychological abuse and "spar[ing] an
individual unnecessary embarrassment .... ).
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grants "tonks" or "wets"43 as well as other vulgar and racist epithets." Yet
other allegations concern illegal arrests or detentions.45
Not all complaints are lodged by undocumented aliens. One immi-
grants' rights advocate estimates that of the abuses reported to AFSC and
Americas Watch, almost half involved U.S. citizens,46 lawful residents or
holders of passports or visas.47 These complaints of misconduct range from
physical brutality to unprofessional conduct in interactions with the
public.48
THE CURRENT INTERNAL COMPLAINT PROCESS IS INEFFECTUAL
The current internal complaint process is plagued by numerous defi-
ciencies. Jurisdiction among the various agencies responsible for investiga-
tion is uncertain and often overlapping. Additionally, complainants are not
apprised of investigative progress, investigations are often conducted by
43. SEALnG OuR BORDERS, supra note 4, at 13. "Tonk" refers to the sound of a flashlight striking
the head of an apprehended alien. "Wet" is short for "wetback" or mojado, a reference to a Mexican
who has illegally crossed the Rio Grande to enter the United States.
44. See, e.g., BRUTALrrY UNCHECKED, supra note 9, at 37. For an account of why police engage
in "blue humor" or offensive speech, see Josephine Chow, Note, Sticks and Stones Will Break My
Bones, But Will Racist Humor?: A Look Around the World at Whether Police Officers Have a Free
Speech Right to Engage in Racist Humor, 14 LaY. L.A. Imrr'L & COMP. L.J. 851, 856-57 (1992).
45. See, e.g., Kevin Courtney, INS Raid in St. Helena Nets Legal Challenge, NAPA VALLEY Raos.
TER, Mar. 8, 1993 at 1; Letisia Mdrquez, Residents Express Outrage Over Local Assist to Border Agents,
VisALA TnAEs-DELTA, Nov. 7, 1992 at A3; Suzanne Espinosa, Farm Workers Sue Border Patrol -
Raids on Homes Called Illegal S.F. CHRON., Nov. 5, 1993 at A3. See also Hearings Before the United
States Commission on Civil Rights, (Testimony of Richard Gonzales at 4-17)(San Diego, Apr. 17, 1993).
Local Border Patrol Sweep Leaves Critics Fuming THE CALwFoRonAN (Salinas), Oct. 31, 1992 at IC;
Redada del Servicio de Inmigracidn Viola Derechos Humanos, Declaran Activistas, 1 LA Voz DE ALTA
CALrnoRNiA, Nov. 4, 1992 at 1.
46. See, e.g., Eric Adams, Migrant Workers Claim Intimidation by INS Agents, BASIN REPUBLI-
cAN RUSTLER, June 17, 1993 at 1; Letter from Mark J. Murphy, Attorney, to Ted Denning, Deputy Chief
Agent, United States Border Patrol (June 25, 1993)(on file with the author)(account of late-night, war-
rantless entry into bedroom of United States citizens by Border Patrol agents and others, with guns
drawn, in search of "wetbacks").
47. OVERwHELMED AND UNPREPARED, supra note 3, at 14 (quoting Cecilia Mufioz, National
Council of La Raza, prepared statement before the Subcommittee on Information, Justice, Transporta-
tion and Agriculture, Committee on Government Operations, Mar. 30, 1992). Mufiloz also testified that
at a recent conference in El Paso, Texas, when the audience of U.S. citizens and residents was asked if
they felt they had been abused by the Border Patrol, "[e]very hand in that room went up." Id. See also
Frontier Injustice, supra note 11, at 23-26; Murillo v. Musegades, 809 F. Supp. 487 (W.D. Tex.
1992)(involving physical and verbal harassment by Patrol agents of U.S. citizens and permanent resi-
dents of Mexican ancestry on and near Texas high school campus).
48. The President of the American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA) told a congressional
subcommittee that many INS personnel "lack civility" and "have no sense of courtesy." OvER-
wum-mm AND UNPREPARED, supra note 3, at 15 (Statement of Theodore Ruthizer, AILA President).
See also Letter from Ignatius Bau, Chair, Coalition for Immigrant and Refugee Rights and Services, to
Ralph Paige, Regional Director, Office of Professional Responsibility, INS (Mar. 31, 1988)(alleging
"Category I&" violations against Oakland, California legalization officer for verbal, psychological and
sexual harassment of applicants for temporary residency)(on file with the author).
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"insiders," and the process is hampered by other factors such as insufficient
resources and the lack of community outreach.
Complaints of misconduct against INS and Border Patrol agents are
currently handled by the Justice Department's Office of Professional Re-
sponsibility (OPR) and Office of Inspector General (OIG), with monitoring
more recently by the Office of Internal Audit (OIA).4 9 According to INS
oversight groups, the internal complaint system is underfunded, understaf-
fed and "undermined by near total secrecy. ' 0
The OIG is generally the entity which receives initial complaints from
the field offices. 5t  The Inspector General either retains the matters or
routes them to the OPR or OIA for investigation.52 The-amendment to the
Inspector General Act specifically provides that the OPR is to investigate
allegations of misconduct by attorneys, criminal investigators, and law en-
forcement officers. 53  According to the INS Operations Instructions, there
49. Former Acting Commissioner Sale stated that the OIA has only been processing allegations
since February, 1993. Hearings on H.R. 2119 Before the Subcomm. on International Law, Immigration
and Refugees of the House Judiciary Comm., 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1993)(prepared testimony of
Chris Sale, Acting Commissioner, INS)(on file with the author). However, its creation was anticipated
as early as the settlement of Pearl Meadows and Velasquez, almost one year earlier. See Pearl Meadows
Settlement Agreement, supra note 42, at 11. Settlement Agreement, Velasquez v. Ackerman, Civ. No.
C-84-20723, (N.D. Cal., Mar 6. 1992) at 10-12 [hereinafter, Velasquez settlement agreement]. Sale
asserts that the OIA is independent of INS operational offices and reports directly to the Commissioner.
When asked for written authority clarifying his jurisdiction and duties, the current OIA Director com-
mented, "the OIA is new and its responsibilities have yet to be defined. I don't know of any written
source for finding out what the function of this office is at this point. I guess you should call the other
offices to find out what they do." Telephone interview with John Chase, Director of the Office of
Internal Audit (Aug. 4, 1993).
50. Frontier Injustice, supra note 11, at 3, 39. For criticism as to understaffing and underfunding,
see Testimony of Marfa Jim6nez, supra note 25, at 9 (observing that INS never requests budget in-
creases for complaint processing proportional to those it asks for enforcement).
51. See 5 U.S.C. App. 3 § 8D(b)(3). In May 1989, the OPR became part of the Office of Inspec-
tor General as part of a departmental reorganization. One of the criticisms of the OPR was that, like the
Justice Department's other internal audit and investigative units, it was not organizationally independ-
ent and thereby jeopardized the impartiality of its reviews. Hearings on H.R. 4054 Before the Sub-
comm. on Legislation and National Security of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1988)(statement of Milton J. Socolar, Special Asst. to the Comptroller General). The
OIG's emphasis appears to be on fraud, waste and embezzlement. See, e.g., OFF. OF TmE INsPECToR
GEN., SEMIANNIJAL RaP. TO CONGRESS (Mar. 1990).
52. INS Operating Instruction § 287. 10g(3). The duties of the OPR director, including receiving,
recording and investigating all allegations of misconduct, are set out in INS Operations Instructions
[hereinafter, Oil. These subregulatory instructions contain substantive and procedural material which
generally correspond to the statute. They are not binding on the public. GORDON AND MkMMAN, supra
note 3, at § 1.02[3][d][i]. The Ols are reprinted in id., vol. 9.
53. Id. In a recent annual report, the OPR notes that this role was formerly the responsibility of an
internal investigative unit within the INS, as opposed to a department-wide OPR now "subsumed" into
the OIG. 1990 OFF. OF PROF. REsp., ANN. REP. To Tm ATT'Y GEN. at 3, n. 3. Nonetheless, the INS
regulations indicate that the OPR is headed by the Director of Professional Responsibility, who is sub-
ject to the general supervision and direction of the INS Commissioner. 8 USC § 100.2(a)(3). See also
1991 OFF. OF PROF. REsp., ANN. RaP. To a Ar'y GEN. at 2 (indicating that misconduct allegations
against INS law enforcement personnel are usually referred to the OIG, which investigates such matters
"on behalf of' OPR, pursuant to a memorandum of understanding).
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are two categories of allegations. "Category I" involves allegations of fel-
ony or misdemeanor violations of state or federal law, violations of federal
civil rights statutes, and administrative misconduct.5 4 "Category I" con-
cerns allegations of non-criminal violations of INS or Department of Justice
standards of conduct, and certain administrative offenses set out in the Ad-
ministrative Manual." In general, Category I complaints are directed to the
nearest OPR office or the central office, and Category II complaints are
handled by the regional sub-offices.56 However, the investigators them-
selves do not seem to have a clear idea about which offices have which
duties and responsibilities.5 7 An employee answering the telephone at the
Office of Inspector General hotline said, "I don't know who really handles
INS complaints. Maybe just the OPR, not the IG. Call the INS." 8
An allegation of misconduct is defined as information from any source
that an INS employee has violated federal, state, or local law, regulations,
or any applicable standards of conduct.5 9 While the instructions outline
complaint procedures, these may be interpreted differently by individual
investigators.
Investigators follow general guidelines, but have broad discretion in
the way they conduct the investigation. They have authority to require an
INS employee to appear and respond to work-related questions under oath,
as well as to limit participation of any person in such an interview.6' They
may also examine, copy, or remove documents, files and other materials
held by the INS. 61
54. 01 § 287.10(d)(1). Complaints may be referred to the Attorney General for prosecution. 5
U.S.C. App. 3 § 4 (d).
55. 01 § 287.10(d)(1).
56. Id.
57. An OPR Assistant General Counsel told an interviewer that "the question of jurisdiction is
very confusing. I'm not sure if I understand myself." Telephone interview with Keith Thomas, OPR
Assistant General Counsel (Aug. 6, 1993). The Deputy Attorney General recently recommended that
the two offices be merged. Daniel Kleidman, Top Deputy's Exit not Likely to Cure What Ails Reno, THE
RFCORDER, Jan. 13, 1994 at 1.
58. Telephone interview with unidentified employee, OIG Hotline (July 8, 1993). Anyone who
has attempted to "call the INS" knows this is no simple matter. A voice mail recording reels off a litany
of informational options, promising that after the completion of one message, a human employee will
offer assistance. After listening to several messages and trying various options, this author found that
the words "complaint" and "misconduct" were never mentioned, nor were any of the various investiga-
tive agencies. Moreover, no human voice ever came on the phone line. See also Jim Belshaw, To Lose
Your Mind Completely, Press 1, ALBUQUERQUE J., July 15, 1993; Jim Belshaw, Press 57, Press 58, Fall
Back and Punt," ALBUQUERQUE J., July 22, 1993 at 13. See also, Frontier Injustice, supra note 11, at 36
(noting that when Americas Watch investigators tested the complaint hotline, they either encountered
telephone operators who could not speak Spanish or were put on hold indefinitely).
59. There are eleven sources of laws, regulations, and standards, including the INS Administrative
Manual, the INS Officer's Handbook and 28 C.F.R. § 45 (Departmental Standards of Conduct). 01
§ 287.10, App. 1.
60. 01 § 287.10(j)(1).
61. 01 § 287.10(j)(2).
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As former agents or employee holdovers from the internal investiga-
tive units, investigators are also likely to be biased and not inspire the confi-
dence of complainants.
62
Under the present system, complainants are unduly separated from the
investigation. Complainants are not apprised of an investigation's status,
the ultimate disposition,63 or of available appellate channels.' The attor-
ney for a minor held in custody at the Florence, Arizona detention center
reports that it took nearly a year to learn the status of her client's OIG
complaint.
65
Furthermore, complainants are not even required to be interviewed by
investigators. There is no average length of time allotted to an investiga-
tion. In the case of one Guatemalan who, in 1990, complained of beatings
while held at the El Centro detention center in California, had been de-
ported by the time the detainee's attorney reported the matter.66 No attempt
was made to locate him or to interview the officers allegedly involved.6 7
Similarly, a detainee from Nicaragua who had participated in a hunger
strike, claimed that three officers entered his cell on August 3, 1990 and
62. The comments of one Araceli Molina, who, in 1989 went to the newly created OIG in El Paso,
Texas to file a complaint regarding the physical abuse of her brother, are instructive: "It appeared to me
that (the investigator] was well known to all the officials here since everybody was greeting him very
nicely and joking around with him. I thought to myself how can this guy who works with all these
officers and is so friendly with them do a good, honest investigation'?" Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Human Rights and Int'l Organizations, H.R. Comm. on Foreign Affairs (testimony of Marfa Jim~nez,
AFSC)(Apr. 18, 1990)(quoting affidavit of Araceli Molina, July 31, 1989). See also Testimony of
Richard Gonzales, supra note 45, at Exhibit 1 (anonymous letter from a Nogales, Arizona patrol agent
commenting on lack of partiality in OIG investigation by former agent and asserting that most agents in
the Tucson Sector "feel that the Patrol and their sidekick OIG are professional cover-up artists...").
63. See, e.g., Letter from Stephen Rosenbaum, CRLA to Ralph Paige, OPR (Mar. 31, 1988)(on
file with the author); Letter from Ralph Paige, OPR, to Stephen Rosenbaum, CRLA (July 22, 1988)(on
file with the author)(regarding verbal, psychological and sexual harassment by an INS legalization
adjudicator in San Francisco); Letter from Claire Schwartz, to the OIG (July 12, 1993)(regarding an
illegal detention of a lawful permanent resident)(on file with the author). But see OFF. oF lrsi'croR
GEN., Samar.wuAL REP. -ro CONGRMSS, supra note 51, at 20 (reporting on (a) the sentencing of an
unnamed special agent who pled guilty to filing false documents regarding a fabricated assault upon him
by an alien and to deprivation of rights of the alien and (b) the suspension without pay of three unnamed
patrol agents who had broadcasted taunts, obscenities and racial slurs and threw a firecracker at Mexican
nationals).
64. See Testimony of Marfa Jimfnez, supra note 62, at 4 (quoting Affidavit of Araceli Molina).
Complainants are not the only ones who have been kept in the dark. See Statement of Milton J. Socolar,
Special Asst. to the Comptroller General, supra note 51, at 4 ("there was no assurance that the Attorney
General or Congress were advised of the results of the work of these many units.").
65. At his attorney's request, the young man was interviewed by an OIG investigator some time in
October 1992. The matter was transferred to the Civil Rights Division, which declined prosecution on
October 29, 1992, about a month after the incident. From that date until June 24, 1993, the case was
referred from one INS office to another. The attorney who had helped to file the claim was constantly
told the case was "under investigation" and, despite promises, was never apprised of the result until she
phoned her local OIG office on September 2, 1993. Testimony of Lynn Marcus, supra note 40, at 3-4 ;
Telephone interview with Lynn Marcus, Attorney, Southwest Refugee Rights Project, (Sept. 2, 1993).
66. Testimony of Lynn Marcus, supra note 40, at 2-3.
67. Id.
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that one of them pummeled him repeatedly in the shoulder, eventually dis-
locating it.68 He filed a written complaint with the OIG the next day. On
August 9, the Office of Civil Rights declined prosecution and the regional
OIG closed the case the next day.69 Neither the complainant nor the sus-
pect officer was ever interviewed."
The current system also lacks outreach and publicity about the com-
plaint process.7 Furthermore, there is not an adequate number of investi-
gators and no time limit on investigation duration.72 As a result of these
system failings and inadequacies, the credibility of the complaint process is
undermined.
TINKERING WITH THE STATUS Quo
As a reaction to the above mentioned, and other problems, attempts
have been made to clarify and expedite the internal review process. How-
ever, these attempts constitute little more than a "band-aid" approach to a
fundamentally flawed process. Two recent settlements of civil suits have
shed some light on the internal complaint review process.
The first, Velasquez v. Ackerman,73 requires that specific allegations of
misconduct involving certain joint INS-local law enforcement operations be
submitted by plaintiffs' attorneys directly to the Office of Internal Audit.74
The OIA Director must then acknowledge receipt of an allegation by send-
ing a letter to plaintiffs' counsel, and must refer all allegations of civil
rights violations to the OPR or OIG.75 If the OIA Director does not investi-




71. A national survey of review boards also noted, "[p]ublicity is problematic for an internal
police department review system, since a successful publicity campaign will invariably increase the
number of civilian complaints filed." N.Y. CITY POLICE DEPT. CIVIA COMPLAINT REVIEw BD., NA-
TIONWIDE SURVEY OF CIVILIAN CoMPLAINr SYsTEMs 31 (1986)[hereinafter NATIONWIDE SURVEY]. See
also Frontier Injustice, supra note 11, at 30-31 (regarding ignorance and fear on the part of prospective
complainants).
72. But see OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., SEMIANNUAL REP. TO CONGRESS 6 (Mar. 1993)(OIG
developed a "90-day initiative" in the El Paso area to provide "a more immediate response" to allega-
tions of civil rights violations by the Border Patrol.)
73. Velasquez Settlement Agreement, supra note 49, at 10-12. For background on this suit involv-
ing INS-police raids of public businesses and communities, see BRUTALITY UNCHECKED, supra note 9,
at 47-48.
74. The Velasquez settlement is in effect through September 6, 1994 and affects only the
Livermore Border Patrol Sector and the INS San Francisco District in Northern California. See Velas-
quez Settlement Agreement, supra note 49. The settlement is operative if at least five law enforcement
officers are present and one of the joint operations exceptions does not apply, e.g., situations where local
officers are providing support to INS for safety, crowd or traffic control, taking custody or for operations
involving the INS Anti-Smuggling Unit or Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force. Id. at 6.
75. Id. at 10.
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an opportunity to present a case for investigation.76 If an investigation is
undertaken, it is to be completed within a fixed time period and the OIA
Director is to inform the plaintiffs of the general findings and conclusions."
Plaintiffs may then submit a letter to the OIA recommending disciplinary or
corrective action and the INS is to advise plaintiffs of its final determination
regarding the action.78
The Pearl Meadows Mushroom Farm v. Nelson settlement79 is sub-
stantially like Velasquez in many respects. The two are similar in terms of
geographic and time limitations, reporting of violations to the OIA, and
opportunities for plaintiff input.80 However, there is one principal differ-
ence in that the Pearl Meadows settlement involves only misconduct related
to INS workplace raids or "surveys."81
While the two settlements do provide some encouragement, they re-
main relatively isolated occurrences; a window into the heretofore obscured
review process. The threshold requirements for investigation are high. 2
Outside the specific instances which form the basis of the Velasquez and
Pearl Meadows settlements, abuse investigation remains largely discretion-
ary. These settlement arrangements may be a step in the right direction, but
their limitations and the hesitancy of the INS to take them seriously have
shown that a more expansive, nationwide adjustment of the complaint pro-
cess is needed.
A further attempt to mend the present review process can be found in
recently proposed INS regulations. The INS published proposed rules in
1992, pursuant to an amendment in the Immigration Act of 1990,83 which
inter alia purport to establish "an expedited internal review process" for
76. Id.
77. Id. at 11.
78. Id. at 11-12.
79. Pearl Meadows Settlement Agreement, supra note 42.
80. The Pearl Meadows settlement agreement expires on June 17, 1995. The suit affects the
Livermore Border Patrol Sector in Northern California and the INS San Francisco District. Id.
81. Id. Plaintiffs alleged a number of incidents of misconduct during raids for which Category I
complaints were filed with the OPR against agents of the San Francisco District, Livermore Sector.
These complaints resulted in no disciplinary action against any agent. See Plaintiffs' Brief Opposing
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Pearl Meadows Mushroom Farm v. Nelson, Civ. No. C-82-1869, at
165-170 (N.D. Cal., May 26, 1989). For background on the case, see Int'l Molders' and Allied Work-
ers' Local Union No. 164 v. Nelson, 643 F. Supp. 884 (N.D. Cal. 1986), remanded with modifications,
799 F.2d 547 (9th Cir. 1986); BrrAI~rrY UNCHECKED, supra note 9. at 44-46. A paucity of workplace
raids since the suit was filed explains why virtually no complaints have been submitted in accordance
with the terms under the agreement.
82. See, e.g., correspondence between Stephen Rosenbaum and John P. Chase, May 28, 1993
through Dec. 1, 1993 (concerning allegations of joint INS-local law enforcement raids on public busi-
nesses and detentions of lawful residents and OIA determination that insufficient specific, factual allega-
tions raised to wan-ant further investigation under Velasquez or that character of operation falls within
settlement exception)(on file with the author).
83. P.L. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (Nov. 29, 1990)("IMMACT 90"), § 503. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1357(a)(5)(B)(iv).
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investigation of agent misconduct.84 Despite recommendations for change,
the Service has done little more than to state that it will investigate "expedi-
tiously" and refer complaints and reports "promptly. '85 These regulations
fall short of the needed overhaul as they simply summarize what is publicly
known about current Department of Justice policy and procedures for inves-
tigating complaints,86 and just meet the minimal requirements of Congress'
mandate to expedite the process.
A third attempted modification of the review process was the congres-
sional adoption of an appropriations bill calling for a citizens' advisory
panel. The legislative initiative for an immigration review commission first
surfaced in a House appropriations bill for FY 1993, H.R. 5678. A congres-
sional conference committee adopted a report which accompanied the bill
requiring the Attorney General to appoint a citizens' advisory panel to ac-
cept and review individual complaints of abuse by the Border Patrol.87 The
panel, to be composed of representatives from INS, the Border Patrol, com-
munity service and human rights organizations, local governments and the
Mexican consulate, is to make recommendations to the Attorney General
and Congress on how to "reduce the incidence of abuse" along the south-
west border.88 Since this panel arose out of the report accompanying the
actual bill, its authority remains unclear. There is no mention of staff,
budget or frequency of meetings. More than one year later, the members
had yet to be named, much less conduct a meeting.89
In the end, the internal complaint process cannot command public con-
fidence or respect because its impartiality will always be questioned and
access by complainants and non-agency authorities will be limited.' °
84. Proposed 8 C.F.R. 287; 57 Fed. Reg. 47,011 et seq. (Oct 14, 1992). The rule is also intended
to define reasonable and unreasonable use of force, to restrict the authority to carry firearms, and estab-
lish other standards with respect to enforcement activities.
85. Id.
86. See OvERWHELmED AND UNPREPARED, supra note 3, at 14 (Statement of Cecilia Mufloz that
the proposed regulations simply reiterate the status quo).
87. H.R. CoN'. REP. No. 918, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1992). This conference report in turn
refers to the Senate report for specific details.
88. S. RaP. No. 331, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1992).
89. Acting Commissioner Sale told Congress in September, 1993 that INS had submitted a propo-
sal to the Justice Department to implement such a Citizens' Advisory Panel. Sale Letter, supra note 17,
at 13. See also 59 FED. REG. 6,658 (Feb. 11, 1994)(notice of establishment of advisory panel to recom-
mend ways to reduce complaints and improve training).
90. See, e.g., David Brown, Civilian Review of Complaints Against the Police: A Survey of the
United States Literature. Research and Planning Unit, Paper 19, London (1983)(unpublished paper on
file with the author). But see, ROBERT H. SuLNICK, CIvIL LITIGATION AND THE PoucE: A METHOD OF
CoMMNmcAriON 39-40 (1976)(noting the efficacy of some internal review systems in a sociolegal study
of several California police departments); JERoME H. SKoLNcK AND JAMEs J. FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW:
PoLiCE AND TmE ExcEssrVE USE OF FORCE (1993) 227 (citing the views of former Special Prosecutor
and San Francisco Police Commissioner John Keker that internal review offers equal or better investiga-
tors than civilian review and that civilian review generates police antagonism and only "illusory and
ephemeral" results)[hereinafter, ABOVE THE LAw].
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KEY FEATURES OF A CIVILIAN REVIEW BOARD
Both the public and the immigration authorities would be well-served
by restructuring the process for receiving, investigating and resolving alle-
gations of misconduct.9 ' Civilian oversight by an independent review
board creates a perception that the process is fair and builds confidence in
the board. This, in turn, encourages the filing of bonafide complaints and a
just and open resolution for complainant and officer alike.92
The concept of external review of law enforcement officials is not a
new one.93 There are three main purposes: 1) to identify and punish the
officer who mistreats; 2) to give the aggrieved individual and the public a
means of redress; and 3) to prevent future misconduct.94 When a paramili-
tary force is ultimately responsible only to itself, there is room for concern
that it will not work to curb its own excesses. Ultimately, the review pro-
cess must gain the acceptance of both the public and the- law enforcement
officers, while not playing an advocacy role for either. Only through impar-
tiality will a review process attain the requisite legitimacy for successful
implementation.95
One example of an attempt to strike just this balance can be found in a
bill introduced by United States Representative Xavier Becerra of Califor-
nia in May, 1993, calling for the creation of an "Immigration Enforcement
91. Many of the suggested elements of the review process are taken from comments submitted to
the INS by an ad hoc working group convened by the American Friends Service Committee and Na-
tional Lawyers Guild Immigration Project, of which the author was a member. See "Preliminary Com-
ments on Section 503(a)(5)(B)(iv) of the Immigration Act of 1990 (Aug. 1991)" (on file with the
author). The author is indebted to the working group members for their insight, debate and ideas. For a
summary of the recommendations, see SEALmo OuR BoRDERs, supra note 11, at 58-59. Attached as an
appendix to this article are proposed regulations for a civilian review board.
92. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 90, at 2, 7; Terrill, Complaint Procedures: Variations on the
Theme of Civilian Participation, supra note 20, at 398 (inability of the police to police themselves);
Edward J. Littlejohn, The Civilian Police Commission: A Deterrent of Police Misconduct, 59 U. DEr. J.
URB. L. 5, 6, 11 (1981)(importance of citizens, especially minorities, airing grievances). The body
which oversees the conduct of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police has been so conscious about the
public's perception of its independent status that it has more than once lamented that its very name in
English - RCMP Public Complaints Commission - implies it is an internal complaint unit. For its
French-speaking constituents, there is not the same problem, as it is known as the Commission des
Plaintes du Public Contre la [RCMP). ("Commission of Public Complaints Against the RCMP"). See
RoYAL CANADLIAN MouNTED PoLIcE PunBac CoMPL.ms CommIssIoN, 1989-90 ANNUAL REPORT at 90
(1990)[hereinafter, 1989-90 RCMP ANN. REP.].
93. See, e.g., Nuflez, supra note 27, at 1603-05; Brown, supra note 90; Locke, supra note 1;
Werner E. Petterson, Police Accountability and Civilian Oversight of Policing: An American Perspec-
tive, in CoMPLDTrs AGAiNsT THE PotacE: THE TREND TO EXTERNAL REvIEw (Andrew J. Goldsmith,
ed., 1991).
94. NATIONWIDE SURVEY, supra note 70, at 32.
95. See ROYAL CAADi Mohuerd PoLIcE PunLIc CoMPLAmuS CommiSSrON, 1991-92 ANNUAL
REPORT at 3, 5 (1992)[hereinafter, 1991-92 RCMP ANN. REP,.].
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Review Commission. '"96 Under the Becerra legislation, H.R. 2119, a bipar-
tisan commission made up of Presidential appointees would be responsible
for investigating individual complaints of civil rights violations by immi-
gration officials or customs agents and making disciplinary and policy
recommendations.
97
While a number of models exist for local civilian review boards, there
are no sufficient nationally-based models.9" Certain features of an over-
sight board are particularly important in the immigration and immigrant
context. The following features should be included in any nationally-based
model.
CONDUCT: A DEFINITION
To this point, the discussion has been about particular abusive prac-
tices by immigration agents or more generally, about "misconduct." The
review board must very quickly face the definitional question of proper
conduct, particularly if the statute is broad. This is perhaps one of the few
areas where H.R. 2119 is too restrictive: it limits the review commission to
complaints of "civil rights abuses." 99
A better model to draw from would be that of the body which oversees
the Canadian national police, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP).
The RCMP Act, creating a Public Complaints Commission, allows the pub-
lic to make complaints "concerning the conduct, in the performance of any
duty or function under th[e] Act," of any RCMP employee or appointee.i°°
Even this broad definition has led to debates about its interpretation be-
tween the Commission and the RCMP.101 However, an advantage is that it
96. H.R. 2119, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). Co-sponsors of the bill are Representatives Don
Edwards (Calif.), Josd Serrano, John Conyers, Ed Pastor, Esteban Torres and Luis Gutifrrez.
97. H.R. 2119, supra note 96. Many of the suggested components of the review process are taken
from "Preliminary Comments on Section 503(a)(5)(B)(iv) of the Immigration Act of 1990", supra note
91.
98. See, e.g., NATIONWIDE SURVEY, supra note 71; Douglas Prez, Police Review Systems, MAN-
AGEMENT INFORMATION SERVICE REPORT (Aug., 1992); Brown, supra note 90; Werner E. Petterson,
U.S. Dept. of Justice Community Relations Service, Compendium of Civilian Oversight Agencies: Civil-
ian Oversight of Police, (1984); Terrill, Complaint Procedures: Variations on the Theme of Civilian
Participation, supra note 20; Richard J. Terrill, Alternative Perceptions of Independence in Civilian
Oversight, 17 J. OF POLICE SCI. AND ADMI. 77 (1990) [hereinafter, Terrill, Alternative Perceptions].
99. H.R. 2119, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1993).
100. Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act, R.S., c. R-9, § 45.35(1).
101. See, 1989-90 RCMP ANN. RE,., supra note 92, at 68-74.; 1991-92 RCMP ANN. REP., supra
note 95, at 114-15. The police have argued for a definition of conduct that is closely tied to the RCMP
disciplinary standards and code of conduct which are set out in the Act. The Commission had obtained
a legal opinion which defines conduct as an act or the omission of an act which can be attributed to an
RCMP on-duty agent and "results in a member of the public being concerned.. . Id. at 114.
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allows for an evolving definition that goes beyond "civil rights" as that term
is interpreted under U.S. federal and state statutes.1 2
"TAKING IT TO THE STREETS": THE NEED FOR OUREACH
Conventional wisdom among activists is that people will not file com-
plaints where there is no publicity about the procedure.103 In other words,
the public must know of its right to complain. Establishment of a "commu-
nity outreach office" would be an important first step in assuring effective
communication with immigrants and other prospective complainants about
the investigative and deliberative procedures of the review body. °
Past experience underlines the importance of outreach in the affected
immigrant communities. Most recently, the Immigration Reform & Control
Act of 1986 (IRCA) provides both positive and negative lessons for future
programs of community outreach.'0" Under IRCA, the Attorney General
was obliged to "broadly disseminate information" about the benefits of le-
galization or "amnesty" and details of the application process. He was also
required to designate voluntary organizations known as "qualified desig-
nated entities" ("QDEs") to assist in the legalization process."
One study of IRCA reported that the INS publicity budget was small
and not always channeled to the appropriate ethnic and immigrant media." 7
102. Interestingly, one commentator has suggested that a civilian review board oversee allegations
of abuse on the part of private individuals as well as public immigration enforcement officers. See
Nuftez, supra note 27, at 1603. While the occurrence of individual acts of harassment and psychological
and physical brutality is alarming and worthy of serious attention, the review board is best suited to
assure the accountability of public officials.
103. See, e.g., Hispanics Seek Voice in Claims of Border Abuse, THE PHomnx GAzErrE, Nov. 7,
1992 at Al. See also Petterson, Police Accountability, supra note 93, at 277 (the agency "must woo and
maintain" public participation - as well as that of the law enforcement officers). Extending the period
for the lodging of all or certain types of complaints could also serve to maximize use of the process. For
an example of the use of such a technique, see Official University Announcement, University of Califor-
nia at Berkeley Police Review Board, THm DAI.y CALIFORNIAN, Jan. 18, 1994 at 6. (complaints must be
filed within thirty days, except for complaints of sexual harassment, which are granted an additional 60
day filing grace period.).
104. H.R. 2119, § 5(b), supra note 96. See also H.R. 2119, § 6(c) (calling for public education and
development and dissemination of multilingual materials about the Commission's complaint
procedures.)
105. 8 U.S.C. 1255a.
106. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1255a(c), (i). See also, H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1000, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, 92-93
(1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5840, 5848 (on the responsibility of the Attorney General to
disseminate information on eligibility for and the benefits of legalization).
107. SusAN GoNzALz BAKER, THE CAUTIOUS WEL oME: THE LEGALIZA-TON PROGRAMS OF THE
IMMIGRATiON REFORM AND CONTROL Acr 121-31 (The RAND Corporation-The Urban Institute, 1990).
Public Media, a public interest advertising firm, called the government's publicity campaign "unrespon-
sive, dull and uninformative" and charged the INS with failing "to create awareness and a climate of
information about the amnesty program" or to address the "powerful mistrust and skepticism" of appli-
cants. See California Legislative Joint Comm. on Refugee Resettlement, Int'l Migration and Coopera-
tive Development, Hearings on Immigration Reform & Control Act: Implementation and Impact in
California 132-33 (Statement of Attorney Stephen Rosenbaum, California Rural Legal Assistance, July
23, 1987)[hereinafter, California Legislative Joint Hearings].
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A sequel to the study noted INS' difficulties in obtaining outreach funds at
the district level, recruiting and training case-handling staff, and working
with local advocates.108 Other analysts observed that a large portion of the
agency budget went to conventional print media and only later did the cam-
paign include special counseling, canvassing, brochures, talk shows, and
telephone hotlines targeted to reach certain communities." ° Still, con-
cluded immigration scholar Bill Ong Hing, when all was said and done, the
INS' media contractor did less to promote public awareness than the advo-
cacy groups and community-based organizations."
l0
Generally, the INS has been criticized for neglecting its "service" man-
date in favor of its enforcement role."' Thus, prospective complainants
may be unwilling to approach INS offices in fear of their being deported.
The creation of a community outreach office may help to lessen these
fears. In addition to the aforementioned INS outreach office, human rights
and community-based organizations could play a role in the outreach pro-
cess by providing educative material and distributing complaint forms." 2
Under IRCA, and based on previous experience," 3 Congress had concluded
that the use of voluntary agencies would encourage immigrants who feared
108. JupFRAs, supra note 8, at 61-69. See also Bill Ong Hing, The Immigration and Naturalization
Service, Community-Based Organizations, and the Legalization Experience: Lessons for the Self-Help
Immigration Phenomenon, 6 GEo. IMMIGR. L.J 413, 424-32 (1992)(description of outreach conducted
by INS).
109. D. M. MEIssNR AND D. G. PAPADEmta-iuou, THE LEG.ALIZATION CouN'rowN: A THIRD
QUARTER ASSESSMENT at 13-15, 18-20 (1988). Doris Meissner, who is now the INS Commissioner, and
her colleague at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace wrote in detail about the financing of
publicity and other problems with the legalization program. Id. at 10-21. See also Hing, supra note
108, at 438-43. (Professor Hing's detailed analysis of legalization outreach noted that INS' publicity
campaign met with mixed results: For example, it was more effective in some ethnic communities than
others, and while its broad message of "amnesty" was conveyed, details about eligibility or the applica-
tion process were not necessarily understood.) But see JutaRAs, supra note 8, at 63 (notwithstanding
shortcomings in outreach and QDE relations, "the INS emerges from legalization with greater capacity
to communicate with immigrants and stronger roots in local communities.")
110. Hing, supra note 108, at 444.
111. See, e.g., OVERWHELMED AND UNPREPARED, supra note 3, at 15, 23 (comments of Former
Commissioner Leonardo Castillo, AILA President Theodore Ruthizer and Harvard Immigration Law
Clinic Instructor Linda Yafiez); JuoR'As, supra note 8 at 86, 92. See also 66 INTERPRETER RELEASES
1403 (Dec. 18, 1989)(remarks of Ex-commissioner McNary declaring that INS should emphasize ser-
vice as much as enforcement); 70 IrTRPRETER RELEASES 1334 (Nov. 22, 1993)(open letter to incoming
Commissioner Meissner from outgoing General Counsel Grover J. Rees advocating that the institutional
culture of of the "Anti-Immigration and Naturalization Service" be changed). Id.
112. Hing, supra note 108, at 444-453. See also Stephen Rosenbaum, The Alien Cloak of Confi-
dentiality: Look Who's Wearing it Now, 4 J.F. KENNEDY L. REv. 23, 29-38 (1992).
113. See GoRDON AND MAILMAN, supra note 3, at § 5.01 et seq.. Reliance on these community-
based organizations is not new. Particularly since World War II, there has been cooperation between the
immigration service and private organizations. These voluntary agencies have performed services at all
stages of immigration, including document preparation, disseminating information, giving legal advice
to immigrants and sponsors, advocating before federal and international policy-making bodies and rep-
resenting immigrants before administrative. branches of the INS and Board of Immigration Appeals. Id.
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and distrusted authority to come forward and apply for amnesty." 4 The
QDEs' "very function was to provide a buffer - a confidential intermedi-
ary - between the INS and the alien. .... ,,115 The border monitoring
projects of the American Friends Service Committee have de facto served
in this capacity for a number of years.' 6 More recently, groups like the
Urgent Response Network in Oakland, California have adopted techniques
made successful by Amnesty International for activating a grassroots mail-
gram campaign following incidents of alleged abuse.' 17
LQut PAS6?: A USER-FRIENDLY INTAKE
A revised review process should be sure to provide for multilingual
outreach materials describing the citizen review board, its duties, and com-
plaint procedures. H.R. 2119, for example, includes a provision for a 24-
hour, toll-free, multilingual hotline to receive complaints, permits com-
plaints to be filed in any form and prescribes complaint forms in languages
reflecting the immigrant populations." 8 The bill requires that the complaint
form be available at all INS and Customs facilities and upon request from
the Review Commission. t9
Considering the intimidation many immigrants experience when deal-
ing with the INS, a revised review process should also provide for distribu-
tion of forms through community-based organizations.1 20  Professor Hing
suggests that the past experiences with community-based organizations
114. H.R. REP. No. 682(I), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649,
5677. See also Perales v. Thornburgh, 967 F.2d 798, 813 (2d Cir. 1992). judgment vacated on other
grounds sub nom. Reno v. Perales, -U.S.-, 113 S.Ct. 3027 (1993)(the court of appeals recognized
that Congress provided for QDEs "to mediate" between the applicants and INS, and for the broad dis-
semination of information, funded outreach services and a lengthy application period). A study by the
RAND Corporation-Urban Institute found that about 70% of the applicants filed directly with the immi-
gration service, bypassing the QDEs. F.D. BEAN, OPENING AND CLOSING THE DOORS, supra note 8, at
70. But see GoNzALaz BAKER, supra note 107, at 126 (explaining the discrepancy through the observa-
tion that applicants often went first to trusted QDEs and then filed their applications with the INS).
115. Ayuda, Inc. v. Thomburgh, 880 F.2d 1325, 1339 (D.C. Cir. 1989). See also MEISSNER AND
PAPADEMETRIOU, supra note 109, at 20 (discussing the INS' "image transformation" and break down of
the "circle of fear" surrounding the agency).
116. See Martfnez, supra note 9, at 86.
117. See NATIONAL NETWORK FOR IMMIGRANT & REFUGEE RIGHTS, THE IMMIGRANT RIGHTS UR-
GENT RESPONSE NETWORK (circa 1992)(on file with the author).
118. H.R. 2119, supra note 96, § 6(c)(2). This includes facsimile, mail, in person, or anonymous
complaints. Canada's RCMP Public Complaints Commission also permits complaints to be made by
toll-free telephone or mail. ROYAL CANADIAN MoUNTED POLICE PUBLIC COMPLAINTS COMMISSION,
1988-89 ANNUAL REPORT at 83 (1989)[hereinafter, 1988-89 RCMP ANN. REP.].
119. H.R. 2119, supra note 96, § 6(c)(2). During the legalization program, a prominent labor union
criticized the Service for not having multilingual brochures and application forms available. California
Legislative Joint Hearings, supra note 107, at 48-49 (Testimony of Jeff Stansbury, Int'l Ladies Garment
Workers Union, May 15, 1987). See also JuFFRAs, supra note 8, at 58-65.
120. In his evaluation of the legalization program, Professor Hing observes that the "community
based organization" is more suited to reaching the grassroots immigrant population than the traditional
immigration assistance agency. Hing, supra note 108, at 444-53.
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(CBOs) under IRCA provide lessons as to their future utilization.1 2 t While
INS would still play a prominent role, it may actually allot space in its
offices to CBO staff. 22 Illustrative of the utility of CBOs is the Albuquer-
que Border City Project, in New Mexico, which was created in part to mon-
itor human rights abuses by immigration enforcement agencies, and to
provide individual pro bono legal assistance.1 23 The partnership of the
comfort provided by a CBO and the legitimacy of the INS could prove a
strong tool for future citizen review boards.
ANONYMOUSLY AND IN CONFIDENCE: FEAR OF RETALIATION
In addition to the usual limitations affecting marginalized members of
society who choose to challenge authority, the immigrant complainant also
faces the threat of deportation. Given the largely unbridled power of the
INS in this area of law, some provisions need to be made to safeguard the
confidentiality of complainants and witnesses, and to protect them from re-
taliation. 2 4 Under the current scheme for filing an administrative com-
plaint with INS, deportation may follow based on the information provided
in the complaint unless the immigrant requests, and is granted, a stay of
deportation.125 Under a revised review process, information gathered dur-
ing investigation should not be admissible against complainants and their
witnesses in deportation or exclusion proceedings. A current example can
be found in Congressman Becerra's proposed legislation. Section 8 of H.R.
2119 prohibits testimony and information gathered as part of a complaint,
investigation, or hearing to be used in any proceeding under the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act.
126
The Immigration Act of 1990 recognizes the need for confidentiality in
internal investigations, but provides no concrete measure for witness and
121. Id.
122. Id. at 462-63. Such a partnership may require a change of mindset for the INS and CBOs
alike. Whereas the former will need to rely on the "residual impact" of the legalization experience to
encourage a philosophy of responsiveness, the latter will need to become more efficient and innovative
in their self-help techniques. Id. Although Hing does not explicitly address the function of complaint
outreach or intake, this author finds his analysis applicable to the review process addressed here.
123. Proyecto ABC/Albuquerque Border City Project (n.d. 1993)(on file with the author). The
project intends to provide intake services in a safe environment and refer individual complaints to the
AFSC Immigration Law Enforcement Project. Telephone interview with Mimi Ltpez, Albuquerque
Border City Project (Aug. 4, 1993).
124. Retaliation has been defined under the Becerra bill (H.R. 2119, supra note 96) as any action or
threat of action against a person, including an immigration agent, because such person filed a complaint,
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation or hearing. H.R. 2119, supra note
96, § 7.
125. 8 C.F.R. § 243.4 (1992). But see INS instruction 01 § 287.10(k)(no action taken to enforce
departure of any witness or complainant or beneficiary of complainant in deportation proceedings).
126. Although H.R. 2119 § 8 allows for complaints to be filed anonymously, it is not clear whether
testimony could also be provided anonymously or confidentially.
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complainant protection.127 Precedent for such provisions is found in IRCA,
which prohibited INS officials from releasing information furnished as part
of the legalization application.
1 28
In the drafting of IRCA, Congress recognized that the legalization pro-
gram could succeed only if "the fear of prosecution or deportation [that]
would cause many undocumented aliens to be reluctant to come forward
and disclose their illegal status.. ." could be overcome.1 29 The confidential-
ity was "meant to assure applicants that the legalization process is serious,
and not a ruse to invite undocumented aliens to come forward only to be
snared by the INS."'
130
Under IRCA, the cloak of confidentiality was intended to cover all
files and records kept by the INS, Qualified Designated Entities, and any
other organizations involved in the application process. Applicants for le-
galization had to consent to the forwarding of their applications to INS for
processing.' 31 This approach was largely successful, with violators subject
to fine and/or imprisonment.'
3 2
An additional enforcement mechanism can be provided through third
party complaints.1 3 3 Canada accommodated immigrants afraid to come for-
ward to seek that country's amnesty several years ago by allowing third
parties to initiate an application for those persons.' 34  Complaints made by
127. Immigration Act of 1990, 8 U.S.C. § 1357 (a)(5)(B)(iv).
128. 8 U.S.C. § I 160(b)(5),7§ 1255a(c)(5). "Whistleblower" laws presently exist to protect Justice
Department employees. 5 U.S.C. §§ 2301(b)(9), 2302(b)(8); 28 C.F.R. § 0.39a(b). Federal prisoners
have also been protected against retribution for making complaints against correctional officers. 28
C.F.R. § 40.9 (1988).
129. McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, 498 U.S. 479, 484 (1991). For a discussion of fear of the
INS, see Hing, supra note 108, at 432-36.
130. H.R. REP. No. 682(I), supra note 114, at 73. See also Rosenbaum, The Alien Cloak of Confi-
dentiality, supra note 112, at nn. 56-67, and accompanying text.
131. 8 U.S.C. § 1160(b)(4)-(5); 8 U.S.C. 1255a(c)(3)-(4).
132. 8 U.S.C. § 1160(b)(5); 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(c)(5). For an account of the INS' strict interpretation
of the confidentiality proviso, see generally, Rosenbaum, The Alien Cloak of Confidentiality, supra note
112.
133. H.R. 2119 § 6(b)(1) states that complaints "may be filed by any person, including anony-
mously and may be filed on behalf of third parties." Id. The concept of broad and liberal standing is
consistent with state practice (e.g., California's consumer protection statutes for injunctive relief on
behalf of the general public) and international practice (e.g., the individual petition procedures of the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, UNESCO and the United Nations' Sub-Commission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities). See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§§ 17200, 22446; American Convention on Human Rights, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/ser.LIV/II.49, doc. 6, rev.
4 (1985); UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) Doc. 104/EX/
Dec. 3.3 (creating an Executive Board Committee on Conventions and Recommendations) (1978); Sub-
Commission Res. I(XXXIV) (1971) on Procedures for Admissibility Under Res. 1503, 11, 48 U.N.
ESCOR, Supp. (No. IA), 8 U.N. Doc. E/4832/Add. 1 (1970).
134. D. NORTH, THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE WITH AMNESTY FOR ALIEN.: WHAT THE UNITED
STATES CAN LEA.RN A-22 (Center for Labor and Migration Studies, 1979).
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public officials, other third parties, or anonymously, are also permitted
under the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act.
1 35
REGIONALIZATION IS ESSENTIAL TO OVmERSIGrn OBJECT VE
A question that must be addressed in the creation of a citizen review
board is whether a single centralized body can adequately review the activi-
ties of a national police force. The sheer size and geographic scope of the
INS and Customs Service distinguish them from local police and sheriffs'
departments. Possible criticism of a nationwide review body may be that a
centralized enforcement board would be too large, while a decentralized
board would be difficult to administer due to the problems of coordination
among the individual branches.
The ability to conduct local investigations and hearings is essential to
the manageability of a -revised review process. Public participation could
be enhanced by holding hearings at different sites throughout the country or
by establishing local or regional adjunct commissions.
1 36
The current Royal Canadian Mounted Police scheme provides a useful
model for the regionalization of a citizen review board. As in the Canadian
scheme, intake and hearings should be held in locales that are convenient to
complainants, witnesses and Service employees alike.1 37 It would also be
useful to have a permanent regional presence. The RCMP has one head-
quarters and two regional. offices. In addition, to receiving and reviewing
complaints, these regional offices maintain contacts with the media and pro-
vide public information.'
38
135. See RCMP Act, supra note 100, Pt. VII, § 45.35(i) ("Any member of the public ... whether
or not... affected by the subject-matter of the complaint, (may] make the complaint .... ). See also
1988-89 RCMP ANN. RaP., supra note 118, at 78-79 (noting that judges, Members of Parliament, Cabi-
net ministers or other public officials may wish to make complaints in that capacity and that anonymous
members of the public may also complain); SKO.NICK AND FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW, supra note 90, at
231 (civilian complaints against police should be encouraged as a source of management information
and should be accepted by whatever means they are lodged, including anonymously).
136. See, e.g., Testimony of Maria Jim~nez, supra note 25, at 9-10.
137. The RCMP commission is to hold hearings where the incident giving rise to the complaint
occurred. 1988-89 RCMP ANN. REP., supra note 118, at 95. The Act allows the Commission to sit
where it chooses, while "having regard to the convenience of the parties." RCMP Act, supra note 100,
at Pt. VII, § 45.45(3). This format is also common in the international human rights forums. See, e.g.,
Regulations of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights at Art. 13(2), in OAS General Secre-
tariat, Handbook of Existing Rules Pertaining to Human Rights in the Interamerican System (1983),
OAS Doc. No. OEA/ser.L/V/l 1.60 Doc. 28 (July 26,1983).
138. See 1991-92 RCMP ANN. RE,., supra note 95, at 15 (importance of local presence in a large
country), 6 (commission has one central and two regional offices). Similarly, H.R. 2119, supra note 96,
5(b) calls for the establishment of regional offices to conduct public outreach.
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INVESTIGATION MUST BE PROMPr AND INDIVIDUALIZED
Time frames are necessary for prompt investigation of complaints in
order for the review system to retain credibility with the public.139 This is
especially important in the immigration enforcement context. Complain-
ants and witnesses tend to be transient because of migration patterns within
the United States and the tendency to return to their native countries, thus
necessitating rapid investigative response in order to secure the presence of
complainants and witnesses.' 4
Unavailability of complainants and witnesses also results from "invol-
untary," or forced, migration."' For example, individuals may be deported
or issued so-called "voluntary departure"142 following an apprehension,
notwithstanding INS instructions permitting deferred departure.
143
An example of the use of a time frame can be found in the Becerra bill.
H.R. 2119 requires that an investigation and written report be completed
within 60 days of assignment unless the board authorizes an extension.
Once an investigation is completed, a three-member panel of the board is to
review the report, and hold a hearing if warranted by the serious nature of
the alleged abuse or by a majority vote of the panel. 1 Among local police
review commissions, time limits for completing investigations may range
from thirty to ninety days.'
The authority of and methods available to investigators vary among
existing police review bodies. Some commissions have subpoena powers
and are able to mandate, cooperation from the police officers; others depend
on voluntary cooperation. H.R. 2119 provides subpoena powers and re-
quires Service employees to fully cooperate with investigations. 4 6 Finally,
special investigative techniques must be generated with an eye towards sen-
sitivity to the language, culture and customs of the particular ethnic com-
munity to which complainants and witnesses belong.'
4 7
139. See THE TARNISHED GOLDEN DOOR, supra note 12, at 141.
140. Comments by Marco L6pez, 7 LA RAZA L.J. 103, 105 (1994).
141. Id.
142. 8 U.S.C. § 1252.
143. See 01 287.10(k), supra note 52.
144. H.R. 2119, supra note 96, at § 6(e)-(f)(l). Compare the time allotted in the settlements agreed
to by INS for internal investigation and referral of raids-related complaints. See Velasquez Settlement
Agreement, supra note 49, at 11 (within 60 days of acknowledgment of complaint); Pearl Meadows
Settlement Agreement, supra note 42, at 8, 11 (ranging from within 45 days of acknowledgment to
unspecified).
145. NATIONWIDE SURVEY, supra note 71, at 16.
146. H.R. 2119, supra note 96, § 6(e).
147. NATIONAL IMMIGRAT1ON LAW CENTER, INS MISCONDucr: LEGAL RIGHTS & REMEDIES § 3.2
(1989)[hereinafter, INS MIscoNDucT]. See also Stephen Rosenbaum and Nancy Martinez, California
Rural Legal Assistance Foundation, Statement Before the American Bar Comm. on Nonlawyer Practice
6 (Mar. 26, 1993)(on file with the author)(reluctance of immigrants to complain to authorities about
abusive practices).
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Not all complaints will necessarily proceed to the stage of investiga-
tion. For example, under the system used by the Royal Canadian Mounted
Police Public Complaints Commission, complaints are first investigated by
the Mounties' internal review process.1 48 The internal process allows for
the rejection of complaints which are trivial, frivolous, vexatious, or made
in bad faith. 49 Rejected complaints may be subsequently investigated by
the Commission where an internal procedural error is identified."' 0
COMPLAINANTS SHOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO REPRESENTATION
In some police review systems, complainants generally have a right to
representation at both initial hearings and in the appeal process. 15 1 H.R.
2119 provides that both the complainant and the Service employee have the
right to be represented by counsel at hearings, to present witnesses, and to
cross-examine witnesses. It also requires that findings be established by a
preponderance of the evidence.
The importance of counsel is particularly great for aliens. As with
many members of disenfranchised segments of society, immigrants are
often undereducated and unsophisticated in legal procedures. However, im-
migrants face additional barriers since many lack proficiency in English
and have no inherent familiarity with the distinctly American concept of
due process.1
52
FUtrTHER FEATURES OF CmzEN REVIEw BOARD
In addition to the aforementioned review procedures, the following
features are essential to the proper functioning of a citizen review board.
These features include provision of adequate and up-to-date information to
complainants regarding the status of their complaints, publication of statisti-
cal information regarding complaints and their ultimate disposition, the es-
tablishment of a mechanism for monitoring patterns of abusive behavior by
148. RCMP Act, supra note 100, at Pt. VII, § 45.36(1). See also 1991-92 RCMP ANN. REP.,
supra note 95, at 11-15.
149. RCMP Act, supra note 100, at § 45.36(5)(b). The Commission has further defined these terms
and has declared that only in the clearest cases should the police refuse to investigate on these grounds.
ROYAL CANADIAN MouwrE PoLaCE PUBLIC CoaP'LAMs CommasSION, 1990-91 ANNUAL REPORT at
39-40 (1991)[hereinafter, 1990-91 RCMP ANN. REP.].
150. Id. at 38.
151. Id. at 16.
152. See SEAINO OUtR BoRDEs, supra note 4, at 18 (noting immigrant victims' ignorance of their
rights, acceptance of abuse as a way of life, involvement in more urgent survival issues and sense of
futility in filing a grievance). See also H.G. Reza, Illegal Aliens Fearful of Border Bandits, Patrol, L.A.
TVMEs (San Diego County ed.), May 12, 1985 at pt. 2, 1 (quoting a police officer. "[Aliens] accept the
robberies, rapes and murders as a part of the price they pay for coming across the border."); David
Hiller, Immigration Policies of the Reagan Administration, 44 U. PITr. L. REv. 495, 502 (1983) ("Few
[undocumented aliens] have dared to avail themselves of their rights under labor and other laws lest
they be recognized and deported.").
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particular agents, and the ability to make disciplinary recommendations.
Additionally, any meetings of the review board should be publicly accessi-
ble unless valid reason is shown for confidentiality.
A first factor in retaining public credibility is for the complainant to be
informed of the receipt of the complaint, the investigation process, and the
ultimate disposition of the complaint.' 53 H.R. 2119 does not now explicitly
provide for any such notification. A viable review process must adopt noti-
fication procedures and should provide for communication throughout the
complaint process.
A second feature aiding in the proper functioning of a citizen review
board is the collection and dissemination of statistical information as to
complaints received and their final disposition. Currently, the offices which
investigate complaints do not have accessible statistical information.154
Under H.R. 2119, the review commission would be required to compile and
publish, at least annually, a statistical summary of all complaints received
and the dispositions of such complaints.' 55 Most existing police review
boards publish such statistics both monthly and annually.' 56 To be effec-
tive, a future citizen review.board should be required to publish its statisti-
cal information monthly, and the publications must be available to the
public.
The third essential feature is the establishment of a mechanism for the
monitoring of patterns of abusive behavior by particular agents. By keep-
ing track of complaints against individual agents, even if unsubstantiated,
an agency can pinpoint and take steps necessary to prevent potential
problems. When an agent accumulates repeated allegations of misconduct
in his or her file, a manager should consider adequate disciplinary
measures.
Several police departments monitor repeat complaints and some rely
on such "recidivist lists" for progressive discipline.' One department
153. See, e.g., 1988-89 RCMP ANN. RE'., supra note 118, at 71-73 (discussing uncertainty of
whether complainant is entitled to know resulting disciplinary action, if any, as part of complaint dispo-
sition); 1991-92 RCMP ANN. REP., supra note 95, at 111-112 (resolving ambiguity in favor of
complainant).
154. "In response to repeated requests under the Freedom of Information Act, immigration officials
said they do not keep track of abuse complaints and have no comprehensive data on internal discipline
of agents." McDonnell, Crossing the Line, supra note 22. On the other hand, the statistics that are
publicly reported by the Inspector General are so general as to be meaningless. The reports include
merely the number of cases opened, closed and pending and investigations and prosecutions referred.
See, e.g., SEPT. 1989, OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., SmAsoNUAL REP. "TO CONGREss at 22-23.
155. H.R. 2119, supra note 96, at § 6(j). Some proponents of the bill suggest that the names of
officers should be kept confidential at least until there is a final finding of a violation.
156. See, e.g., NAIONWIDE SURVEY, supra note 71. But see San Francisco Police Officers' Ass'n
v. Superior Court, 202 Cal. App. 3d 183, 191-92 (1988)(statistics of Office of Citizen Complaints not to
be released.).
157. For example, the Seattle and San Jose (Calif.) Police Departments monitor and the Boston
department maintains a progressive discipline file. NATIoNwroE SURVEy, supra note 71, at 33.
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tracks any encounter where the officer reports resisted arrest or battery of
the officer."'8 In another, commanding officers are sent a copy of each
complaint against one of their subordinates, and are held accountable for
the conduct of officers under their command.1
5 9
H.R. 2119's version of a recidivist list is the "Early Warning Pro-
gram."' Under this program, the commission would conduct a periodic
review of all complaints in order to determine whether particular Service
employees have been the subject of repeated complaints or have otherwise
demonstrated they may be having difficulty dealing appropriately with
members of the public.' 61 The results of the review would be presented to
the particular service, and the commission would make recommendations
regarding training or counseling.' 62 The program outlined under H.R. 2119
serves as an acceptable model.
The ability to recommend discipline to the INS or Customs Service
could be essential to any review board's effectiveness. 63 The disciplinary
recommendation portion of H.R. 2119, for example, provides that when a
finding may constitute a criminal offense, the board must notify federal or
state authorities. In all substantiated complaints, the board will recommend
disciplinary action based on a schedule of sanctions determined by the com-
mission. If the Service does not adopt the board's recommendations, it
must submit a written explanation within thirty days. The recommenda-
tions and Service refusals are to be made public."6
In the experience of police review commissions, the more authority a
board holds, the more resistance it meets from the police departments and
officers.1 65 However, over time, even authoritative boards can become ac-
cepted as part of the system. Initial restraint may be advisable in the crea-
tion of the INS review commission, and further powers, such as binding
recommendations, could be granted as the board becomes established.
A final feature that should be mentioned is the nezd for openness in the
review board's hearing process. Meetings of the board, as well as all deci-
158. Id. at 47 (Gainesville, Florida).
159. Id. at 26 (New York City).
160. H.R. 2119, supra note 96, at § 6(i).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. One commentator notes that the corrective action can take the form of instruction, counseling,
and supervision, as well as punishment. See Petterson, Police Accountability and Civilian Oversight of
Policing, supra note 93, at 282. Petterson also encourages conciliation of complaints and agreement
between the police executives and oversight body on the actual discipline. Id. at 281-82. See also
Terrill, Complaint Procedures: Variations on the Theme of Civilian Participation, supra note 20, at 402.
164. H.R. 2119, supra note 96, at § 6(h)(2). The Becerra bill does not make the disciplinary rec-
ommendations binding, and does not contemplate a meeting or re-assessment by the board after the
Service has issued its refusal to comply with the suggested discipline. Id.
165. See e.g. Brown, Civilian review of Complaints Against the Police, supra note 90 at 9; NATION-
wIDE SuxvLv, supra note 71 at 29; discussion infra, notes 163-181 and accompanying text.
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sions reached at such meetings, should be accessible to the public. How-
ever, it must be recognized that accessibility may be curtailed when faced
with valid concern of confidentiality on the part of complainants, witnesses,
or other involved parties.'6 6 Hearings and transcripts should be open to the
public, unless there is good cause for keeping them closed.
THE "GREEN WALL" OF SILENCE: AVOIDING UNIFORM(ED) RESISTANCE
A new review board may have an excellent structure, good administra-
tion, and be widely accepted by the public but, unless it also has the cooper-
ation of the agency over which it is to keep watch, it will be fairly
ineffectual. The 'Green Wall' 67 of silence could so obstruct investigations
as to make them practically useless. Therefore, a new review board must
take steps and institute policies designed to be fair while not sparking resist-
ance on the part of the agencies that it must review.
Many communities have implemented police review commissions with
varied functions and authority. Common commission functions include
overseeing police activities, providing an accessible forum for complaints,
undertaking investigations, acting as liaisons between police forces and
their communities, and making policy recommendations.' 68 The commis-
sions initially met with resistance by police forces, but after a time have
been accepted as a necessary part of the system. 6 9
There are indications that the INS and its employees will resist review
from an independent body. The resistance at the top echelons may be
couched in polite terms. For example, the former Acting INS Commis-
sioner recently told Congress that "it is neither necessary nor desirable to
create a new bureaucracy of this size. .. .""o However, in a less guarded
statement, the Director of Internal Audit called H.R. 2119 "duplicative" and
"from out in left field."''
The response from the rank-and-file may be more angry or cynical.
172
The proposed review board may not be denounced by INS agents as "a page
166. See, e.g., 1988-89 RCMP ANN. REp., supra note 118, at 78.
167. The "Green Wall" is in reference to the green uniforms worn by Border Patrol agents.
168. See NATIONWIDE SURVEY, supra note 71, at 18-27.
169. See Brown, Civilian Review of Complaints Against the Police, supra note 90.
170. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 2119 Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Law, Immigration & Refugees
of the House Judiciary Comm., 103d Cong., 1st Sess., 15 (1993)(testimony of Acting INS Commissioner
Chris Sale). Of course, internal review systems are not completely ineffectual, particularly where sup-
ported by the agency chief. See also NATIONWME SURVEY, supra note 71, at 29; SULNcri, supra note
90 at 39-40.
171. Telephone interview with John Chase, Director of the Office of Internal Audit (Aug. 4, 1993).
A supervisory patrol agent for the San Diego Sector stated in bland bureaucratese: "There are currently
sufficient independent entities in place to oversee our activities." Patrick McDonnell Oversight Panel
for Border Patrol Is Urged, L.A. TMs (San Diego) Feb. 9, 1991 at BI.
172. Frustration and demoralization are nothing new to the INS field staff, nor is cynicism toward
decisions made in the nation's capital. Commenting on another policy matter in the mid-1980s, one San
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right out of the Communist handbook... to weaken [police] work, to inca-
pacitate them or make them a subject of ridicule,"' 73 but, the men 74 in
uniform are sure to fight change. Law enforcement officers have long sub-
scribed to the doctrine of the "blue wall of reluctance."'' 75  On the question
of agency morale, the president of the INS employees' union had a few
years earlier testified before Congress: "So they find themselves damned if
they do and damned if they don't. The frustration levels are very
high. . .[there is] a very severe. . .morale crisis within the INS work
force."
176
Although some degree of internal resistance is certain, it should not be
allowed to derail the process. Many means exist to ensure law enforcement
compliance with the board. To implement an acceptable review process,
experts recommend that there be fairness, 77 access and openness.' 78  In
Ysidro, California Patrol agent told his Central Office superior: "You know we're down here playing a
game. They (in Washington] don't want us to do our job..." quoted in Krrry CALAvrrA, INSIDE THE
STATE: THE BRACERO PROGRAM, IMMIGRATION, AND THE INS 164 (1992). Officers will also attempt to
minimize the acts of violence by their own members, contending that most of the violence is caused by
immigrant "thieves and smugglers" in the border zone. See, e.g., McDonnell, Oversight Panel for Bor-
der Patrol Urged, supra note 171, at BI (comments of Border Patrol Agent Ted Swofford); McDonnell,
Crossing the Line, supra note 22 (comments of the frontline agents).
173. A publication from the National Fraternal Order of Police, circa 1960s, quoted in SKOLNICK
AND FYFE, supra note 90, at 222, reacting to the creation of police review boards. According to the
police organization, the party line is that "police are the enemies of communism." Id. One study of the
use of deadly force by police captures the same sentiment in less strident terms: "Any effort to disarm
(or even control) an armed police force violates the public (and police) conception of the essence of
policing - even though this conception may have little foundation in reality." SCHARF AND BINDER,
BADGE AND THE BuLEr, supra note 21, at 228 [emphasis added].
174. The word "men" is used advisedly as it is too early to speak of a long history of women in law
enforcement. But interestingly, in one of the rare instances when one officer alleged that abuses were
committed by another, a female Border Patrol agent appeared as a witness against her fellow officer
from the Imperial Beach, California station at the latter's criminal trial for assault. She testified that,
"There is a code that we are not supposed to tell on other agents." Frontier Injustice, supra note 11, at
33.
175. Remark of Retired Sgt. James Dowd of the New York Police Department, testifying before the
mayoral "Mollen Commission" investigating police corruption and abuse. Dowd and other former of-
ficers were referring to the unwillingness of the department's internal affairs bureau to confront corrup-
tion. Steven Lee Myers, Officers Describe Police Watchdog Agency as Ineffectual, N.Y. Tnms, Oct. 2,
1993, at A27. But see, comments of New York police officers' association president: "If we find dirty
cops ... we don't protect them." Selwyn Raab, New York City's Police Allow Corruption, a Panel
Reports, N.Y. TunEs, Dec. 29, 1993 at Al, B12. One commentator notes the contention that "the 'blue
code' will never permit the close scrutiny of an officer's behaviour," Petterson, Police Accountability
and Civilian Oversight of Policing, supra note 93, at 272. This assertion has been corroborated through
litigation and commission investigations. Id. Those who do break ranks may be shunned, or harassed.
Id. See also Testimony of Richard Gonzales, supra note 45, at Exhibit 1, 3 (Arizona patrolman writes
in anonymous letter that "some agents who have been truthful and walk a straight line, that have com-
plained about certain abuses ...have been subjected to a pattern of harassment by Border Patrol
management and their co-workers.").
176. K. CALAvrrA, supra note 172, at 165 [emphasis, brackets and ellipses in original]. See also
Dunn, Official's Exit Blamed, supra note 22.
177. See 1989-90 RCMP ANN. REP., supra note 92, at 87-89 (citing A. ALAN BOROVOY, WHEN
FREEDOMS COLLIE 254-55 (1988)) on the officers' concern about self-incrimination. One way this has
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particular, investigators must be "hardnosed" and experienced, and the
hearing officers should be fair and qualified.179
Because the agents are apt to ignore requests for records and thus de-
lay the work of the review board, the board must be given access to docu-
ments and witnesses through legal mandate or subpoena power. The
process must also allow for the accused - and the accuser - to know the
outcome and reasoning of the hearing. For the exonerated officer, disclo-
sure will restore public confidence in the process and in the individual. For
the guilty agent, disclosure will hopefully deter the misconduct and inform
fellow officers that such conduct will not be tolerated.' 80
One of law enforcement's greatest fears of civilian review is that "re-
sponsible" persons will yield influence or power to a board "captured" by
64a minority community's most outrageous representatives."' 8 1 Therefore,
in the interest of effectiveness, professors Skolnick and Fyfe counsel the
selection of review board members who are distinguished by their expertise
and impartiality, but who may not be "representative" of the community at
large.'82 At first blush, this view would appear to be at odds with the sym-
bolic value of a review commission "opening up" the police force by di-
rectly involving citizens in the process. 83 In the end, the heads of
immigration law enforcement branches and their subordinates must recog-
nize that in order to gain public support they ultimately need to be scruti-
nized about what they do, how they do it, and why.'8'
been handled is to require that officers answer all questions regarding misconduct in the context of
civilian complaint investigations, but to exclude their testimony in disciplinary hearings. Borovoy dis-
agrees; he distinguishes between "jailing" agents and "firing" them. As public officers with extraordi-
nary powers, agents should be held accountable. Id.
178. Professors Skolnick and Fyfe write that "[c]ops won't ever like civilian review .... " SKOL-
NICK AND FYFE, supra note 90, at 228. But, a fair and open process run by experienced and qualified
people can make it more acceptable.
179. Id. at 131.
180. Id. One researcher, however, found that police officers may respond more positively to a
complaint registered with the chief of police than with criminal courts, the city council or the press.
SULNICK, supra note 90, at 40.
181. Locke, supra note 1, at 6. Professor Terrill also notes the role of "powerful interest groups" in
influencing policy outside the traditional checks-and-balances model of government. Terrill, Alternative
Perceptions, supra note 98, at 82. He adds, however, that the civilian oversight movement has not in
fact attained that status. Id. See also 1990-91 RCMP ANN. REP., supra note 149, at 151; Brown,
Civilian Review of Complaints Against the Police, supra note 90 at 6 (on capture).
182. SKOLNICK AND FYyv, supra note 90, at 228-29. "In this setting, diversity has to defer to
expertise." Id. One police investigator recommends, in classic public administration terms, that civilian
panels be composed of members with backgrounds in judicial, legal, investigative and educational ex-
pertise, with "[mierit, not race, religion or membership in any group" as a selection criterion. Terry
Hensley, Civilian Review Boards and Police Accountability, 36 TEx. PoLIcE J. 11, 12 (Dec. 1988).
183. Locke, supra note 1, at 13.
184. Id. at 10, commenting on the same phenomenon among police administrators and officers.
See also 1991-92 RCMP ANN. REP., supra note 95, at v. (citing Andrew Goldsmith, who posits that
"induced compliance" by the officers "is almost always preferable to exacted deterrence.").
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IV.
ALTERNATIVE REDRESS BEYOND CIVILIAN REVIEW BOARD
In recommending an external review process for disciplining immigra-
tion officers and promoting good conduct, one should not overlook alterna-
tive means of redress.
CONCILIATION
City councils in some border cities have attempted to set up municipal
advisory commissions to improve relations between the Border Patrol and
local communities.' In Albuquerque, an INS Community Relations
Board was established in 1991. Organized with the help of a New Mexico
senator and the Albuquerque Border City Project, the Board meets regularly
with INS officials to "air grievances and to raise issues" regarding Border
Patrol policies and practices. 1 6 However, the board members' role is re-
stricted to asking questions of a general nature.' 7
A further example of a community advisory commission designed to
improve relations can be found in El Paso, Texas. The "Border Patrol Lo-
cal Accountability Commission," created in 1992 by the El Paso City Coun-
cil," 8' is authorized to conduct independent investigations, hold hearings,
and to report at least quarterly to the City Council.1 9 Its mandate is to
monitor Border Patrol adherence to the principle of "common regard for
human dignity and conduct toward one another."" The El Paso commis-
sion has no power of subpoena, and generally lacks ,the means to force its
recognition. 191 The head of the local Border Patrol has refused to recognize
the body, claiming his federal agency is not required to follow the advice of
a local entity.192
185. For example, in San Diego, California, in 1992 the City Manager and Chief of Police estab-
lished a task force on border violence pursuant to the authority of the Immigration Reform and Control
Act of 1986 (IRCA). Testimony of Marfa Jiminez, supra note 25, at 9. Former California Congress
Member Leon Panetta established a task force on immigration for his central coast constituents, partly in
response to allegations of INS misconduct. See, e.g., Minutes of the Joint Task Force on Immigration &
Naturalization Service Activity for Santa Cruz and Monterey Counties, Oct. 31, 1990 (on file with the
author).
186. Proyecto ABC, supra note 123.
187. Id.
188. Ordinance Creating the Border Patrol Local Accountability Commission (July 28, 1992)[here-
inafter, El Paso Ordinance].
189. Id. at § 3. However, the commission does not have subpoena power. Interestingly, the ordi-
nance guarantees the commissioners' legal defense and indemnification for lawsuits and judgments aris-
ing from discharge of their duties. Id. at § 5.
190. Id. at § 2.
191. Id -
192. According to Americas Watch, the El Paso commission was created by the El Paso City Coun-
cil as a grassroots response to "the unwillingness of immigration law enforcement authorities to rein in
abusive agents.. ." Frontier Injustice, supra note 11, at 3.
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As if to underscore his refusal to recognize the authority of the city of
El Paso and in order to maintain control of the complaint process, this same
patrol chief created a "Border Patrol Community Relations Board" in Feb-
ruary 1993.193 The board is composed of ten civilian members and serves
mainly as a "liaison and avenue of communications between the U.S. Bor-
der Patrol and the general public."' 94 The board has virtually no authority
to take action on complaints, enforce recommendations, or influence pol-
icy.'95 Its intended role is to "route inquiries and other information through
proper channels." '196
Although a community relations board has the potential to improve the
Border Patrol's image and perhaps win some public confidence,' 97 it does
little to address the fundamental weaknesses of the complaint process itself.
This is not to say that all efforts to deter misconduct must be found exclu-
sively in the external oversight process.' 98 Local efforts should be contin-
ued. However, it must be recognized that they can only supplement a
national, external review commission.' 99
BETTER OFFICER SELECTION AND TRAINING
A second alternative mechanism to increase INS accountability is
through the production of better officers. A promise to improve training
has long been the INS response to critics of the incidents of violence.200 In
1991, the OIG had concluded that "[tihere are no INS policies or proce-




196. Telephone interview with Richard Bowen, Chair, Border Patrol Community Relations Board
(July 6, 1993). The only complaints the board, composed of both "men and ladies," had received in-
volved traffic and other minor matters. Id.
197. Testimony of Acting Commissioner Chris Sale, supra note 49, at 6. See also Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986, P.L. 99-603, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 100 Stat. 3359, 3381 (congressional
appropriations language in IRCA requiring that some INS funds be used "for enhanced community
outreach," including the establishment of "local community task forces to improve the working relation-
ship" between the Service and local groups.).
198. See Comments by Valenzuela Malag6n, supra note 22, at 94-96 (Valenzuela's experience
with the Operativo BETA forces in Mexico regarding cooperation of different groups including law
enforcement). See also supra note 163 and accompanying text.
199. But see Petterson, supra note 98, at 270 (asserting that advisory committees intended as fo-
rums for community-police dialogue are often established by police executives and associations hoping
to ward off civilian oversight). "[I]n too many cases, these committees are made up of persons who are
already friendly, if not infatuated, with the police." Id.
200. Americas Watch has called attention to the irony of the "Officer Integrity Course for Border
Patrol Agents" training materials: "The business of the United States Border Patrol is 'people.'... How
these people are treated will leave a lasting impression of, not only the Border Patrol, but the United
States in general." BnurrrY UNCHECKED, supra note 9, at 1. But see SEALJG OuR BoRDtS, supra
note 4, at 13-14 (describing racist text and instructor's remarks from training course); BRaurALrrY UN-
CHECKED, supra note 9, at 1-2 (noting comments by INS officials and the Office of Inspector General on
inadequate training and supervision of agents).
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dures accurately reflecting recent statutory changes affecting the use of fire-
arms... INS management has not updated its firearms policy to reflect the
terms of the new legislation. This may lead to violations of authority on the
part of uniformed service employees." 20' Responding to the report, the
then-INS Commissioner wrote that new regulations were currently being
developed,2" 2 yet none of the recommendations were included in the pro-
posed rule.2 °3 In July 1993, the Acting Commissioner announced the "im-
minent approval" of a policy on the use of non-deadly force and the
revision of the INS Firearms Policy.2" She also stated in her letter to all
district directors and chief patrol agents that "all managers are accountable
for the actions of their subordinates" and must provide them with training,
education and on-site supervision.
20 5
Currently, the Border Patrol's screening and hiring policies fall below
acceptable minimum standards for an enforcement agency. In its haste to
get agents in the field, the Border Patrol has hired individuals with criminal
records and past problems with other law enforcement agencies.2 An en-
forcement agency needs top employees in the field. The Border Patrol and
other agencies charged with enforcement of the immigration laws should
strive to recruit only individuals of high moral character and to keep their
pay scale commensurate with other law enforcement agencies.20 7
ALIEN ACCESS TO THE COURTS
Opponents of civilian review often point to civil litigation and criminal
prosecution as alternatives.208 Perhaps the principle alternative of redress
presently available for INS abuse is through the courts. In theory, suits for
201. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., AuDrr REPORT: IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE FIrE-
ARMS POLICY (1991). The OIG made 27 recommendations that the INS should incorporate to update its
policy. Id. at 11-18. Interestingly, INS is not the only federal law enforcement agency under fire for its
weapons policy. A coalition of organizations ranging from the American Civil Liberties Union to the
National Rifle Association has urged the President to form a commission to study abuses including
improper use of deadly force, physical and verbal abuse and the use of paramilitary units by the FBI,
Drug Enforcement Agency, and other agencies. See Coalition Assails U.S. Law Agencies, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 11, 1994, at A8.
202. See Testimony of Chris Sale, supra note 49, at 21.
203. 8 C.F.R. 287 (implementing § 503 of the Immigration Act of 1990). 57 Fed. Reg. 47,011
(1992) et seq.
204. Sale Letter, supra 17, at 1. The firearms policy, still not finalized when the letter was written,
is located at Admin. Manual 4210.
205. Sale Letter, supra note 17, at 2. See Sebastian Rotella, Costs, Risks of Halting Illegal Immi-
grants Debated, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1993, at A27 (remarks of Border Patrol Union President T. J.
Bonner citing a lack of training and experience in response to the suggestion that the National Guard
help police the border).
206. See McDonnell. Crossing The Line, supra note 22.
207. For the recommendations of the Mexican Human Rights Commission for a more humanitarian
approach for enforcement, see infra note 275. See also 70 Interpreter Releases, supra note 11, at 1334.
208. See Terrill, Alternative Perceptions, supra note 98, at 78. Accord, Hensley, Civilian Review
Boards and Police Accountability, supra note 182, at 12.
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declaratory relief and damages under state or federal law may be brought
against the U.S. Government or the INS, or against Border Patrol agents
named individually or in their official capacity. 2°9 However, attempts to
discourage Service misconduct through litigation have been only partially
successful.
One theory often used in litigation against the INS is that of the Fourth
Amendment prohibition on illegal search and seizure. Use of this technique
to suppress evidence can be found in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza.2 t° In Lopez-
Mendoza, the Supreme Court held that given the degree of training received
by INS agents, the probability of conducting an unreasonable search and
seizure is remote. 21 ' However, the Court left the door open to protecting
aliens against egregious violations by the INS or in instances where arrests
were not peacefully effectuated.21 2
Even the minimal guarantees provided under Lopez-Mendoza, how-
ever, may not be available to immigrants who lack "sufficient connections"
to be considered part of the "community" worthy of protection under the
test set out by the high court in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez."3 The
Verdugo-Urquidez Court explained that under the Fourth Amendment, "the
people" refers to "a class of persons who are part of a national community
or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to
be considered part of that community."2 4 Noncitizens in border areas
could easily find themselves beyond the reach of the Fourth Amendment. 215
In contrast, aliens are on firmer ground when it comes to protection
under the Fifth Amendment. The federal government is prohibited from
depriving "all persons," including undocumented immigrants, of life, liberty
or property without due process of law. 2 16 Nonetheless, as a practical mat-
ter, the right of an alien to petition for redress of grievances is limited by
the fact that courts tend to defer to INS officials and to immigration policy
209. See generally Comments by Marco L6pez, 7 LA RAZA L.J. 103 (1994).
210. 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
211. According to the majority, there was no "good reason to believe" that such violations were
"widespread." Id. at 1050. Lopez-Mendoza can be read as the Court's concern for the unfettered imple-
mentation of U.S. immigration policy at the expense of the rights of undocumented immigrants. In the
end, no exclusionary rule in the immigration hearing process means there is no deterrent to illegal arrests
and detentions. See Nufiez, supra note 27, at 1580-81.
212. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, supra note 210, at 1051.
213. 494 U.S. 259 (1990) (Search and seizure by U.S. drug enforcement agents of property of non-
resident alien located outside the United States held beyond the scope of Fourth Amendment
protections).
214. Id. at 265.
215. For a comparison of a "universalist" versus "exclusive" approach to safeguarding rights for
persons located within a nation's borders, see Nuilez, supra note 27, at 1582-84.
216. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976); Nufilez, supra note 27, at 1584-85.
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generally,2" 7 and that aliens may still be deported even if a civil suit has
been filed.2""
One commentator has observed that it is one matter to describe the
constitutional rights of immigrants and another to protect them "in a mean-
ingful way."'2 9 Three commonly applied theories for recovering damages
arising from constitutional violations are the so called Bivens220 suit, ac-
tions filed under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)22 1 and actions filed
under the Federal Civil Rights statutes.22 2 These alternative means of re-
covery, in some combination, are frequently found in one lawsuit against
the individual immigration officer and the United States government.
223
The Bivens suit is essentially a complaint directed at an individual fed-
eral agent.224 Such a suit is available as a common law damage remedy for
plaintiffs whose constitutional rights have been violated by federal officials,
but for whom Congress had not provided a specific remedy. 2' However,
given their tenuous constitutional status discussed above, undocumented
plaintiffs cannot be certain of the court's protection.
226
Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, persons whose rights have been
violated by INS or Border Patrol agents may pursue a money damage action
against the U.S. Government, as opposed to the individual officers. The
FTCA waives sovereign immunity for the tortious conduct of federal em-
ployees while acting within the scope of their employment. Liability for
injury is based on the law of the state where the negligent or wrongful act or
omission occurred, and will only be imposed if the officer involved would
have been liable as a private individual.227
217. See Nuflez, supra note 27, at 1586-87. Along the border there is even more judicial deference
to the executive branch to resolve "political questions" or international policy questions. Alexander
Aleinikoff, Aliens, Due Process and Community Ties: A Response to Martin, 22 U. Prrr. L. Rav. 237,
258-59 (1983).
218. See Nufkez, supra note 27, at 1586-87. On the phenomenon of post-filing deportation, see
supra note 141-143 and accompanying text.
219. Nufitez, supra note 27, at 1587, 1588-1602.
220. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971).
221. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346 (b), 2671-80 (1993).
222. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 (1993).
223. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 20 (1980).
224. Lopez v. Aran, 600 F. Supp. 323 (D.P.R. 1984).
225. See Bivens, supra note 220, at 396 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)). Ele-
ments of a Bivens action that the plaintiff must prove are: 1) a constitutional right has been intentionally
violated by a federal officer, 2) a damage action is not precluded by any action taken by Congress and
public policy would not warrant against the court awarding damages in the case and, 3) the violation was
committed by a federal officer who is not immune from personal liability. The suits are against officers
in their individual capacity, which means they must be financially solvent. See also INS Miscozmucr,
supra note 147, at §§ 6.2-6.5.
226. See NufIez, supra note 27, at 1588-92, discussing court's discretion in application of constitu-
tional protection.
227. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1993).
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The Federal Civil Rights statutes,228 which have proven so successful
in combating race-based and national origin-based discrimination, may also
be used as a remedy by aliens for abuse by law enforcement officials.
However, the circuits disagree about the ability of undocumented aliens to
sue under Section 1981.229
One legal obstacle in all of these litigation options is the defense of
qualified immunity, which shields federal officials from liability if their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights
of which a reasonable person would have known.230 Additionally, the main
difficulty in succeeding in FTCA suits is proving that the agent's act or
omission was negligent, wrongful, or both.23' Also, under the FTCA, an
agent may be viewed as acting outside the scope of his or her employment
when depriving immigrants of their constitutional rights. Thus, the more
extreme the misconduct, the less likely a FICA suit will be successful.
Finally, discretionary exemptions under 28 U.S.C. Section 2680(a) may
shield officers from liability.
232
Civil suits for both monetary damages and equitable relief have been
filed under the above theories against immigration enforcement officers
who allegedly engaged in misconduct. In Pearl Meadows Mushroom
Farms v. Nelson and Velasquez v. Ackerman, for example, agents of the
immigration service were sued for Fourth Amendment violations resulting
228. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 provides that all persons within the United States have the same right "to the
full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed
by white citizens." Section 1983 creates a liability against state officials for "deprivation of any rights,
privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution .... Only the latter is applicable to federal
immigration officers, absent proof of conspiracy with state officials. See Peck v. United States, 470 F.
Supp. 1003 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). See also 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (recovery for conspiracy to deprive individ-
ual of equal protection or equal privileges and immunities); 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (liability for failure to
prevent civil rights conspiracy if within power).
229. Nufiez, supra note 27, at 1595, argues that section 1981 should be applicable to undocumented
aliens as they are "a distinct, identifiable group ... subject [to] prejudice and mistreatment by individu-
als and state action .... " See id. at 1592-98 for a discussion of reliance on civil rights statutes.
230. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The test of the reasonable person's knowl-
edge was in essence an objective one: Was the law clearly established at the time of the incident? If so,
can the officer prove either that s/he did not know - or should have known - the relevant legal
standard? This objective test was completely modified in Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987),
to permit a defense that an officer had a reasonable, albeit mistaken, belief in the lawfulness of his or her
actions.
231. This assessment is based primarily on questions of fact, in which the testimony of the immi-
grant is pitted against the testimony of the officer. The immigrant is often at a disadvantage in terms of
language ability and knowledge of the law.
232. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h)(1993) provides: "... with regard to acts or omissions of investigative or
law enforcement officers of the United States Government, the provisions of this chapter and section
1346(b) of this title shall apply to any claim arising ... out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false
arrest, abuse of process, or malicious prosecution. For the purpose of this subsection, 'investigative or
law enforcement officer' means any officer of the United States who is empowered by law to execute
searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violation of Federal law." Id.
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from raids on workplaces and in public businesses and residences.233 Most
of the relief was equitable, including long-term injunctions against raids in
most of northern California. Eventually, the parties settled with the hope
that future misconduct could be deterred by a better-monitored complaint
and discipline process.
234
In Casarez v. Reidinger 35 and Centeno v. United States,236 individual
INS officers were sued for damages under Bivens and FTCA theories. In
the former suit, agents had unlawfully detained and physically abused two
permanent residents in the same incident that gave rise to the companion
raids suit for equitable relief.237 The case eventually settled.231 In Centeno,
several Central American detainees sued the United States, individual INS
detention officers and other employees for physical injuries and inattentive
care that arose from incidents during their detention at the INS Processing
Center in El Centro, California.2 39  The defendants failed in motions for
qualified immunity and the case eventually settled for money damages on
confidential terms24° .
More recently, two suits were filed following early morning warrant-
less raids on the homes of immigrants conducted in two small California
communities by Border Patrol agents together with local law enforcement
officers. In Mendoza v. City of Farmersville' and De Haro v. City of St.
Helena,242 Border Patrol agents and local police officers allegedly entered
the homes of noncitizens, on two different occasions, in the early morning
without warrants or consent.243 The plaintiffs are suing in part on a theory
233. See supra notes 42-49 and accompanying text.
234. Pearl Meadows Settlement Agreement, supra note 42; Velasquez Settlement Agreement,
supra note 49.
235. First Amended Complaint, Casarez v. Reidinger, supra note 34.
236. First Amended Complaint, Centeno v. United States, Civ. No. 91-1014 (C.D. Cal., Sept. 25,
1992).
237. First Amended Complaint, Casarez v. Reidinger, supra note 34, at 6-10.
238. Stipulation and Order Approving Compromise Settlement, Casarez v. Reidinger, Civ. No. C-
87-20267 (N.D. Cal., Feb. 23, 1990). Plaintiffs were to be paid $18,000.
239. First Amended Complaint, Centeno, supra note 236, at 10-26.
240. Telephone Interview with Linton Joaquin, attorney for plaintiffs (Oct. II, 1993). Joaquin
could not disclose the terms of the June 1993 settlement. He cautions that only suits for egregious
conduct are really financially feasible and that the plaintiffs must be prepared to face motions and
discovery requests from every named defendant. Id.
241. First Amended Complaint, Mendoza v. City of Farmersville, Civ. No. CVF 93- 5789 (E.D.
Cal., Jan. 3, 1994).
242. First Amended Complaint, De Haro v. City of St. Helena, Civ. No. C93-3457 (N.D. Cal.,
Nov. 30, 1993). Only the local police and sheriff deputies are named as defendants. No FTCA pre-
litigation claim has been filed to date against the United States.
243. For background on these suits, see Espinosa Farm Workers Sue Border Patrol, supra note 45.
See also discussion of Velasquez v. Ackerman and Pearl Meadows Mushroom Farms v. Nelson, supra
notes 73-82 and accompanying text.
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of constitutional violations, and their burden in support of declaratory and
injunctive relief is a heavy one. 2"
Viable legal theories notwithstanding, it is perhaps the financial and
psychological conditions of would-be plaintiffs and the preservation of evi-
dence that create the greatest disincentives to litigate. Some of these deter-
rents to litigation are the same ones that thwart individual administrative
complaints: the deportation or disappearing of witnesses or plaintiffs,"4
the difficulty of discovery,2" linguistic or cultural difficulties in communi-
cating and credibility problems.
247
Moreover, putative litigants are often indigent and lack an understand-
ing of the availability of judicial remedies.248 Even when plaintiffs can win
a case, the damages awarded are often insufficient or may be reversed on
appeal.249 Fear of reprisal against a key witness has prevented litigation in
some cases.
250
Another insufficiency of litigation is that alleged misconduct may not
be unconstitutional or a violation of criminal law, but is nonetheless per-
ceived to be improper behavior or a procedural abuse of agency regulations
or policies.2z 1
Criminal prosecutions of Border Patrol agents or other immigration
officers for abusive practices provide another means of seeking relief. For
example, eleven officers were indicted between 1979 and 1991 on charges
of aggression against noncitizens, ranging from physical abuse, threats and
assault with a weapon, to sexual assault.
252
244. See e.g., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95,
105-11 (1983).
245. See, e.g., Comments by Marco L6pez, supra note 140, at 104-5, discussing cooperation by
U.S. Border Patrol and Baja California state police in Mexico. These authorities apprehended witnesses
to a 1989 shooting by a U.S. border patrolman, detained them in a private compound in Mexico and told
them not to cooperate in any investigation of the shooting. Id.
246. Id. (inability to obtain the name of the offending agent).
247. See Nufiez, supra note 27, at n. 151.
248. See Nufiez, supra note 27, at 1580-1602.
249. See, e.g., Garcia v. United States, 826 F.2d 806 (9th Cir. 1987)(court reversed a $2.1 million
damages award and dismissed the case of a Mexican couple. The husband was shot in the stomach by a
Patrol agent while protesting the agent's apprehension of a juvenile. The husband died before the Gov-
ernment filed its appeal. See also AFSC v. United States, supra note 39, at 9-11).
250. See, e.g., AFSC v. United States, supra note 39, at 26 (incident involving El Centro Border
Patrol Agent Luis Santiago Esteves. Rape charges against Esteves were dropped when his Mexican
victim refused to testify out of fear for her safety). See also Frontier Injustice, supra note 11 at 9; infra
text accompanying notes 259-61.
251. Terrill, Alternative Perceptions, supra note 181, at 78 (1990).
252. United States Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Investigations Division,
Fact Sheet (unpublished paper on file with the author). The charges were filed against ten Border Patrol
agents and one INS detention officer in Texas and California between 1979 and 1989. These resulted in
six convictions, two guilty pleas, one mistrial, one acquittal and one dismissal in exchange for resigna-
tion from the INS.
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Two notable prosecutions are the cases of United States v. Elmer253
and People v. Esteves.25 a In Elmer, a criminal conviction seemed inevita-
ble. The agent shot an unarmed alien twice in the back, dragged his body
fifty yards, tried to bury it, threatened his partner, and failed to report the
incident to his supervisors. Nonetheless, Agent Elmer was acquitted of the
charges of murder, attempted murder, assault and obstruction of justice.255
Attorneys involved with the prosecution offer varied explanations for
the acquittal. One blames the loss on the county prosecutors, whom he
describes as inexperienced in civil rights cases with political implica-
tions.256 Another described the result as typical of most prosecutions of law
enforcement officials, and likened it to the state trial of the Los Angeles
police officers that followed the notorious 1991 Rodney King beating.257
One attorney explained that there were major difficulties in having the state
court prosecution removed to federal court. 25 ' The speculation about what
or who is to blame for the loss is less important than noting that when it
comes to criminal prosecutions of law enforcement officials, juries are ex-
tremely reluctant to convict the defendants.
On the other hand, California Border Patrol Agent Luis Santiago Es-
teves was eventually convicted of forcible rape and oral copulation against
a twenty year old immigrant woman. He had detained her to check her
papers and then forced her at gun point to disrobe and engage in sexual
acts.259 This conviction followed an unsuccessful state prosecution for rape
against a minor who, approximately 18 months earlier, Esteves had offered
to assist with her deportation hearing. Instead, he sexually assaulted and
battered the young woman. Although he was eventually acquitted of rape,
the incident led to Esteves' arrest and conviction for the earlier rape. Both
rapes followed earlier allegations of sexual harassment by a U.S. citizen.
Nevertheless, Esteves remained as an agent with the El Centro Patrol Sector
for two years after the reported misconduct.2 °
253. U.S. v. Elmer, CR-92-456-TUC, supra note 38. Patrick J. McDonnell, Officer's Acquittal in
Border Slaying Sparks Protests, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 18, 1992; John Rawinson and Laura Brooks, Verdict
Outrages Minority Groups, Victim's Relatives, AIz. DAILY STAR, Dec. 17, 1992 at Al.
254. No. 14866, Imperial Co. (CA) Superior Court, 1992.
255. Tessie Borden, Jury Clears Border Agent in Alien's Killing, ARIz. DAILY STAR, Dec. 17, 1992
at Al. Elmer was subsequently charged with aggravated assault stemming from another shooting inci-
dent that occurred before the Miranda killing. See Frontier Injustice, supra note 11, at 6-7.
256. Telephone interview with Jesds Romo-Vejar, attorney for the victim's family (July 26, 1993).
257. Telephone interview with Richard Gonzales (Aug. 3, 1993). See also Comments by Marco
L6pez, supra note 140, at 104-5 (on the difficulties of working with the FBI).
258. Telephone interview with Jesse Smith, Santa Cruz County (Ariz.) Prosecutor (July 26, 1993).
Elmer, who has since resigned from the Patrol, was retried in U.S. District Court for federal civil rights
violations and acquitted. Elmer is Acquitted of Rights Charges in Slaying of Alien, ARIZ. DAILY STAR,
Feb. 4, 1994 at AI.
259. Frontier Injustice, supra note 11 at 9-10.
260. Id. at 8-10.
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If disciplining offending officers is one aim of the litigants, there is no
guarantee that a damage award, an injunction against the INS or a guilty
verdict will result in the reprimand, suspension or termination of an individ-
ual officer. However, as with civil litigation, criminal prosecutions are a
remedy that should be pursued despite the many hurdles.26'
INTERNATIONAL FORUMS
International forums, such as the Organization of American States
(OAS) or the United Nations (UN), are also available to victims of INS and
Border Patrol abuse, but usually only when all domestic remedies have
been exhausted.2 62 Given the threat of deportation and the inaccessibility of
the American justice system, domestic remedies are often difficult to at-
tempt, much less exhaust. International petitions have been used on behalf
of large numbers of plaintiffs represented by human rights organizations.263
International forums cannot necessarily provide relief such as mone-
tary damages, injunctive relief or disciplinary action.2" Still, the process
can result in heightened international scrutiny and diplomatic pressures
which may ultimately curb or mitigate the abusive practices. The petition
processes are also less costly and less fraught with procedural and eviden-
tiary obstacles that are likely to impede civil litigation in the United
States.2 65 Finally, the petitions can be brought by laypersons and grassroots
266activists.
In 1983, a community-based organization and its lawyers petitioned
the OAS Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the U.N. Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minori-
261. See MEXICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, supra note 23, at 72 (recommending further col-
laboration between the FBI and Mexican investigative authorities).
262. See Htctor Gros Espiell, The Organization of American States (OAS), in THE INTERNATIONAL
DIxMESIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 552-4 (Karel Vasak and Philip Alston ed., 1982).
263. For an explanation of the international human rights instruments and procedures, see, e.g.,
M.E. Tardu & T.E. McCarthy, Complaint Procedures of the United Nations Organization, in HUMAN
RIGHTS: THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM (1985); GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIoTrrs PRACTICE
(Hurst Hannum, ed., 1984); Robert Norris, Bringing Human Rights Petitions Before the Inter-American
Commission, 20 SANTA CLARA L.Rav. 733 (1980); Philip Alston, UNESCO's Procedure for Dealing
with Human Rights Violations, 20 SANTA CLARA L.REv. 665 (1980). For a discussion of domestic
application of international law, see, e.g., Kathryn Burke, Sandra Coliver, Connie de la Vega & Stephen
Rosenbaum, Application of International Human Rights Law in State and Federal Courts, 18 TEX. INT'L
L.J. 291 (1983); Gordon A. Christenson, The Uses of Human Rights Norms to Inform Constitutional
Interpretation, 4 Hous. J. INT'L L. 39 (1981); Joan Hartman, Enforcement of International Human
Rights Law in State and Federal Courts, 7 WHrrrmR L.REv. 741 (1985); Paul L. Hoffman, Symposium
on International Human Rights Law in State Courts: A View from California, 18 INT'L LAW 61 (1984).
264. See Tardu & McCarthy, supra note 263; Alston, supra note 263.
265. See Stephen A. Rosenbaum, Pro Bono Publico Meets Droits de L'homme: Speaking a New
Legal Language, 13 Loy. L.A. ITrr'L & CoMP. L.J., 499, 506-7 (1991).
266. See, e.g., Report of the Secretary-General 1, U.N. Doc. EICN.4/1317 (1979)(stating criteria for
filing of complaint under ECOSOC Resolutions 1235 (1959) and 1503 (1970)).
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ties26 7 following the drowning deaths of ten undocumented farm workers in
the United States in the course of raids on agricultural lands adjacent to
canals or other bodies of water.268 Although the petition was ultimately
dismissed for failure to state a cause of action, the petitioners managed to
keep the matter on the Commission agenda for more than three years and
therefore in the public spotlight.26 9 Related publicity and the attention
brought to the deaths by prominent clergy, professors, news media and the
Mexican Consul may have finally prodded the local INS agents into carry-
ing lifesaving equipment.270
A 1992 petition filed with the Inter-American Commission by several
nongovernmental organizations in the United States and Mexico as well as
the alien victims - and survivors - of INS' use of force, decries the per-
functory investigations and minor punishment of Service officers that fol-
lowed public charges without convictions or lawsuits with judgment for the
defendants.27 t
The OAS petition documents the procedural status of each plaintiff
and illustrates the inadequacies of domestic remedies.272 A problem for
many of the plaintiffs was that their indigence prevented them from pursu-
ing appeals after an unfavorable trial court decision.273 As these cases
indicate, the cost of an appeal is often prohibitive for victims of Border
Patrol and INS abuse.
267. This is a subsidiary of the Commission on Human Rights that receives individual complaints
pursuant to ECOSOC (UN Economic and Social Council) Resolution 1503, 48 U.N. ESCOR, Supp.
(No. 1A), 8 U.N. Doc. E/4832/Add. 1 (1970). For more on this procedure, see M. E. Tardu, United
Nations Response to Gross Violations of Human Rights: The 1503 Procedure, 20 SANTA CLARA L. REv.
559, 559-60 (1980).
268. On the utility of using the inter-American system for complaints of Border Patrol abuse, see
Rosenbaum, Pro Bono Publico Meets Droits de L'homme, supra note 265, at 512-14, 524-35; AFSC v.
U.S., supra note 39.
269. See Rosenbaum, Pro Bono Publico Meets Droits de L'homme, supra note 265, at 524-26.
270. Id. at 524.
271. AFSC v. United States, supra note 39. The petition cites approximately twenty instances of
gross human rights violations in the use of deadly force, improper use of firearms and physical and
verbal abuse, along the border with Mexico. Petitioners claim that the INS internal procedures are
inadequate for redressing their grievances and ask for an on-site investigation by the human rights
commission. Id. at 8-12. The Commission opened a case on the matter and advised the United States
Government of the complaint. Letter from Edith MArquez Rodriguez to Peter Schey (Oct. 19, 1992)(on
file with the author).
272. AFSC v. United States, supra note 39.
273. Petitioners included a man shot when coming to the aid of his pregnant wife who was being
abused by a Border Patrol agent, another who was beaten by Border Patrol agents while on the ground,
suffering permanent back and shoulder injuries and a man rendered paraplegic when shot by a Border
Patrol agent. Other petitioners were the wife of a man who died after being shot by a Border Patrol
agent, a man shot by a Border Patrol agent while in Mexico, losing use of his left foot, and the family of
a woman who died from a heart attack brought on by severe stress in an INS interrogation. AFSC v.
United States, supra note 39, .at 8-12. Many of these incidents are also chronicled in BRtrALrry UN.
cacH w, supra note 9, and SEAii4o OuR BoRDERs, supra note 4.
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Still, the petitioners must rebut the argument by the United States that
they have not exhausted their domestic remedies and that their indigence
alone does not excuse them seeking further relief in U.S. courts before turn-
ing to international tribunals.274
Diplomatic channels must also be utilized where possible. The Mexi-
can Human Rights Commission, for example, suggests an expanded consu-
lar presence in the United States to interview detainees, hear their
complaints and assist in their deportation and exclusion proceedings.275
The Commission also recommends a presence at international bridges, air-
ports and other locations where Mexican citizens are "endangered" by U.S.
law enforcement.276 Other suggestions include an "ad hoc mechanism" to
protect and settle problems related to the human rights of migratory workers
to eradicate border violence.277 Finally, the Mexican officials recommend
better training for the Border Patrol in "the idea of undifferentiated respect
for human life and dignity" and that the officers "be inculcated with an
increasingly less police-like stance, or one aimed at combating criminal
practices, and increasingly more humanitarian attitudes ... 278
V.
CONCLUSION
In the end, policymakers - with help from advocates and analysts -
will have to wrestle with the threshold question of civilian oversight. If a
review board is to truly spotlight abuses, punish unacceptable behavior and
encourage an acceptable code of conduct, one must consider some of the
elements discussed above. The special characteristics of immigrants and
immigration law enforcers mean that the system must be perceived as ac-
cessible, confidential, prompt, impartial and even-handed.
The policymakers will also need to ask themselves how to measure the
success of any review board. This will mean more than counting the
number of complaints filed or cases brought to hearing.
However, a civilian review board alone cannot always deter miscon-
duct. Despite some of the obstacles mentioned here, lawyers must perse-
vere with civil suits for damages, criminal prosecutions, and petitions to
international organizations or tribunals. And, if the abusive conduct is to be
ended, nongovernmental human rights organizations must continue to "mo-
274. See Letter from Domingo E. Acevedo to Peter Schey (Sept. 9, 1993)(on file with the author).
See also Hector Gros Espiell, The Organization of American States (OAS), supra note 262, at 552-54.
275. MExcAN HuMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, supra note 23, at 70-71 (accomplished through a 1974
exchange of diplomatic notes).
276. Id. at 71.
277. This idea was first proposed in a 1990 summit between Presidents George Bush and Carlos
Salinas de Gortari. 1d. See also Comments by Victor Clark Alfaro, supra note 23, on the potential of a
binational monitoring commission.
278. MmacAN HumAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, supra note 23, at 72.
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bilize shame"279 against the immigration authorities and the United States
government in all available forums.
279. This term was coined by Professor Emeritus Frank C. Newman, University of California at
Berkeley, School of Law (Boalt Hall).
LA RAZA LAW JOURNAL
APPENDIX
PROPOSED MODEL REGULATIONS: IMMIGRATION LAW
ENFORCEMENT CIVILIAN REVIEW BOARD
Sec. 1 Outreach.
(a) The Board shall designate one employee as the Board National
Outreach Coordinator.
(b) The Board shall designate one employee at each District Office as
the Board District Outreach Coordinator.
(c) The National Outreach Coordinator shall be responsible for devel-
oping and implementing a plan to make the public aware of the internal
review process and to assist persons filing complaints.
(d) The outreach plan shall, at a minimum, include provisions for the
following:
(i) establishment and operation of a toll-free hotline staffed by multil-
ingual personnel, to receive complaints;
(ii) development of written outreach materials in multiple languages,
including posters and brochures, which provide basic information about the
right to file a complaint if an abuse has occurred and the process for filing a
complaint;
(iii) dissemination of outreach materials to INS facilities, including re-
gional, district and local offices, INS detention centers or any contract facil-
ity where detainees are held in INS custody;
(iv) coordination with District Outreach Coordinators;
(v) liaison activities with voluntary agencies and community-based or-
ganizations and with appropriate electronic and print media.
(e) Priority in implementing the outreach plan, including allocation of
funds, shall be given to areas along the United States' southern border.
Sec. 2 Complaint form.
(a) A uniform complaint form shall be developed.
(b) The complaint form shall be available in multiple languages.
(c) The complaint form shall be made available in regional, district
and local INS offices, as well as in any facility where persons are detained
under INS custody.
(d) INS shall also make the complaint form available through private
voluntary agencies and community-based organizations, especially those
serving the immigrant community.
Sec. 3 Filing of complaint.
(a) Complaints may be filed in person, by mail or by telephone.
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(b) When a complaint of officer misconduct is brought to the atten-
tion of any Service or Board employee, the employee shall inform the com-
plainant of proper procedures for filing a complaint.
(c) Anonymous complaints and complaints from third parties shall be
received.
Sec. 4 Acknowledgment of receipt of complaint.
The Board shall acknowledge, by mail, receipt of all complaints,
whenever it has a mailing address for the complainant. Along with the
acknowledgment, an information packet describing the internal investiga-
tion process and the rights of the complainant and subject of the complaint
shall be sent to the complainant.
Sec. 5 Representation of complainant.
Complainants shall have the option of being represented in the com-
plaint process by an attorney, representative of a non-profit organization, or
anyone else not charging a fee.
Sec. 6 Retaliation.
(a) The procedure established for the filing of a complaint alleging
misconduct on the part of a Service employee prohibits retaliation. "Retali-
ation" means any action or threat of action, including but not limited to
action to enforce other provisions of the Act (e.g., provisions relating to
exclusion and deportation), against anyone because he or she has filed a
complaint, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investiga-
tion, proceeding, or hearing related to the procedures established for the
filing of a complaint.
(b) Complainants who are in detention shall be afforded special meas-
ures of protection against retaliation, including removal upon request of the
complainant to a detention facility other than that in which the accused
Service employee is employed.
(c) Any written statement describing the procedure for the filing of a
complaint shall include an assurance that participation in the complaint pro-
cedure will not result in formal or informal retaliation.
(d) Any person shall be entitled to pursue through the complaint pro-
cedure an allegation that retaliation has occurred.
Sec. 7 Confidentiality.
(a) The identity of any complainant or witness shall be considered
confidential.
(b) This right of confidentiality may be waived at any time by the
complainant or witnesses, with respect to themselves only.
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(c) Information discovered in the course of an investigation shall not
be used by the Service to initiate deportation or exclusion proceedings, nor
may it be used by the Service in any way in any immigration proceeding.
(d) Any Service or Board employee who uses, publishes, or permits
information to be examined in violation of this section or engages in any
other unauthorized use of such information shall be subject to disciplinary
proceedings.
Sec. 8 Selection and training of investigators.
(a) Each complaint shall be investigated by an employee of the Board.
(b) Investigators shall not be employed concurrently in any other
branch of the Service.
(c) The Service shall ensure that adequate numbers of women and mi-
nority-group officers are represented in the applicant pool from which in-
vestigators are chosen.
(d) Investigators shall receive formal training in appropriate topics, in-
cluding: (1) standards regarding the use of force; (2) professional standards
of conduct; (3) appropriate investigative methods; and (4) the rights of both
complainants and officers accused of misconduct.
Sec. 9 Assignment of cases.
(a) Every complaint shall be assigned to an investigator.
(b) Every incident involving the use of deadly force by a Service em-
ployee shall be assigned to an investigator, regardless of whether a com-
plaint has been lodged.
(c) The most serious and complex cases shall be assigned to the most
experienced investigators. In determining the level of seriousness and com-
plexity involved, such factors as the type of misconduct alleged, the rank of
the accused employee, the number of complainants and employees in-
volved, and the amount of any publicity received shall be considered.
(d) No investigator shall be assigned to a case involving an individual
with whom he or she is personally acquainted.
(e) The investigator shall be notified in writing of his or her assign-
ment, and shall receive a copy of the complaint (if written) or a written
statement of the facts alleged (if oral) and any supporting documentation
provided by the complainant or other source.
Sec. 10 Investigative procedures.
(a) A set of standard procedures shall be developed for each of the
following categories of complaints: (1) Category One: felonies or acts in-
volving the use of deadly force; (2) Category Two: Misdemeanors and acts
involving the excessive use of non-deadly force; (3) Category Three: Non-
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criminal violations of professional standards of conduct. The procedures
developed shall be appropriate for the nature and seriousness of each
category.
(b) Any referral of complaints to outside agencies for investigation for
possible prosecution shall be monitored by the Board. Such referral shall in
no way inhibit or impede the internal investigative process, which shall
continue until a final disposition is reached, nor shall it prevent the appro-
priate Service supervisor from imposing disciplinary sanctions.
(c) In each case, the investigator shall interview the complainant.
Where future investigations are warranted, the investigator shall first inter-
view all the witnesses to the incident, and finally the subject of the
complaint.
(d) Each individual to be interviewed shall be notified in advance of
the time and place of the interview. Complainants, witnesses and employ-
ees accused of misconduct shall be notified of their right to have a represen-
tative present during the interview.
(e) Interviews shall be recorded on tape or by stenographer. Volun-
tary consent of complainants and witnesses who are not Service employees
must be obtained prior to recording.
(f) Investigators shall not wear uniforms.
(g) A finding that an employee violated the law shall result in prompt
referral to the appropriate agency.
(h) If a complainant or witness has an outstanding deportation order,
the Service shall not execute the order until the investigation is complete
and a final disposition rendered.
(i) The subject of any investigation regarding the use of deadly force
shall be temporarily reassigned, pending the final disposition of the investi-
gation, to a position in which he or she is unlikely to encounter a situation
requiring the use of deadly force.
(j) Investigation shall be completed in no more than 60 days except in
the following situations, when the investigation shall be completed in no
more than 30 days: (1) the case involves the use or alleged use of deadly
force by a Service employee; (2) the complainant or a witness is in the
Service's custody; or (3) other special circumstances identified by the
Board warranting expediting the investigation.
Sec. 11 Disposition of complaints.
(a) Each complainant, or his or her designated representative, and the
subject of the complaint, shall receive written notice of the preliminary dis-
position of the complaint immediately upon termination of the investiga-
tion. Such written notice will include designation of a category of
disposition and a detailed finding of fact.
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(b) The categories of disposition to be used are: (1) sustained; (2) not
sustained; (3) exonerated; (4) unfounded; and (5) misconduct not based on
the original complaint.
(c) When the investigation is complete and a final disposition reached,
the entire record, including the investigative file, shall be available to the
public, subject to confidentiality protections.
Sec. 12 Request for reconsideration.
(a) A form for request for reconsideration by the Board and informa-
tion on deadlines for filing it will be included in the written notice of pre-
liminary disposition sent to both complainant and subject of complaint.
(b) Complainant and subject will have 15 days from the date on notifi-
cation of the parties of the preliminary disposition to file a request for re-
consideration. The Board may extend the deadline for filing upon the
written request of either party, only if good cause is shown.
(c) If neither complainant (or complainant's designated representa-
tive) nor subject file a request for reconsideration, the investigation will be
closed and the disposition will become final.
(d) A notice of final disposition, including a disposition reference to
any request for reconsideration, will be mailed to the parties within 30 days
of the deadline for filing the request for reconsideration, or within 15 days
in cases where the complainant or witnesses are in INS detention, in cases
where deadly force has been alleged, or in other special circumstances de-
termined by the Board.
(e) Requests for reconsideration shall be handled by an appeals unit
within the Board that is distinct and separate from the Board's corps of
investigators.
(f) When complaints are sustained, a final notice shall be sent to the
complainant describing the disciplinary action taken against the subject by
INS.
Sec. 13 Disciplinary action.
(a) When a complaint against an INS officer is sustained, discipline
shall be imposed by the appropriate Service supervisor, consistent with Ser-
vice command structures, and subject to approval by the District Director,
Border Patrol Sector Chief, or other appropriate Service district or sector
supervisor.
(b) The disciplinary action imposed shall fall within the range of ac-
tions established by Service disciplinary guidelines.
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Sec. 14 Use of recidivist lists for performance review.
(a) Once three complaints have been filed against a particular officer,
that officer will be placed on a Service recidivist list.
(b) A supervisor will be notified when an officer under his or her
command appears on a Service recidivist list. The supervisor will conduct a
review of said officer's performance and will recommend appropriate reme-
dial action, including training or counseling, as necessary.
(c) Multiple complaints filed against Service officers under a particu-
lar supervisory officer's command shall trigger a performance review of
that officer consistent with Service command structures, and appropriate
remedial action will be taken as necessary.
Sec. 15 Records of Complaints and Statistical Summaries.
(a) Records regarding the filing of complaints which allege miscon-
duct on the part of Service employees shall be systematically collected and
maintained by the Service or the Board. These records shall include recidi-
vist lists of Service employees against whom complaints have been filed.
(b) Consistent with the provision regarding confidentiality, the Ser-
vice or Board shall compile and publish, at least annually, a statistical sum-
mary of all complaints received and their final dispositions.
(c) At a minimum, these summaries should include the following in-
formation: the number of complaints filed, the citizenship of the complain-
ant, the race or national origin of the complainant, the sex of the
complainant, whether the complaint was filed by a Service employee or a
private individual, the Service region and district in which the complaint
arose, the job title of the accused Service employee, the category and type
of complaint, the ultimate disposition of the complaint, and any sanctions
imposed.
(d) Such statistical summaries should be available to all Service em-
ployees and to the public.
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